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SUMMARY
Binary analysis detects software vulnerability. Cutting-edge analysis techniques can
quickly and automatically explore the internals of a program and report any discovered
problems. Therefore, developers commonly use various analysis techniques as part of their
software development process. Unfortunately, it also means that such techniques and the
automatic natures of binary analysis methods are appealing to adversaries who are looking
for zero-day vulnerabilities.
In this thesis, binary analysis is considered a double-edged sword for the users, based
on their purpose. To deliver the benefit of the binary analysis only for credible users such
as developers or testers, this thesis aims to present a practical system to strengthening the
binary analysis for the trusted parties and weakening the power of the binary analysis against
the untrusted groups exclusively.
To achieve the aforementioned goals, this thesis presents the new domain of the binary
analysis in two directions: 1) a protection technique against the fuzz testing and 2) a new
binary analysis system to expand the applicability of the current binary analysis techniques.
The mitigation approach will help developers protect the released software from attackers
who can apply fuzzing techniques. On the other hand, the new binary analysis frameworks





Binary analysis is widely adopted for detecting software bugs but brings the similar amount
of benefits for both the trusted parties and the adversaries. Recently, various state-of-the-art
techniques contributed to unearth the critical software vulnerabilities for the developers.
Unfortunately, those advanced techniques also empowered the adversaries who are hunting
for zero-day vulnerabilities.
Among the widely used binary analysis techniques, fuzzing is a software testing method
that aims to find software bugs automatically. It keeps running the program with randomly
generated inputs and waits for bug-exposing behaviors such as crashing or hanging. Due to
its effectiveness and scalability, it has become a standard practice to detect security problems
in complex, modern software [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]; thus developers commonly use fuzzing as
part of test integration throughout the software development process.
Nevertheless, advanced fuzzing techniques can also be used by malicious attackers to find
zero-day vulnerabilities. Recent studies [8, 9] confirm that attackers predominantly prefer
fuzzing tools over others (e.g., reverse engineering) in finding vulnerabilities. For example,
a survey of information security experts [10] shows that fuzzing techniques discover 4.8
times more bugs than static analysis or manual detection. Therefore, developers might
want to apply anti-fuzzing techniques on their products to hinder any fuzzing attempts
conducted by attackers, similar in concept to using obfuscation techniques to cripple reverse
engineering [11, 12]. To solve this problem, we propose a new mitigation approach, called
FUZZIFICATION, that helps developers protect the released, binary-only software from
attackers who are capable of applying state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques.
1
Besides the anti-fuzzing problem, an important challenge we are encountering in the
binary analysis is Windows application fuzzing. Fuzzing on the Windows OS is not well-
explored. Since existing fuzzing techniques are mainly applied to Unix-like OSes and
Windows application contains various challenges for applying the fuzzing technique, few of
them work as well on Windows platforms. Therefore, Windows applications are not free
from bugs. A recent report shows that in the past 12 years, 70% of all security vulnerabilities
on Windows systems are memory safety issues [13]. In fact, due to the dominance of the
Windows operating system, its applications remain the most lucrative targets for malicious
attackers [14, 15, 16, 17]. To bring popular fuzzing techniques to the Windows platform, this
thesis investigates common applications and state-of-the-art fuzzers, and identifies various
challenges of fuzzing applications on Windows:
1.2 Research Outline
This thesis proposes two systems to tackle the aforementioned problems. First, this thesis
proposes a technique called FUZZIFICATION that consists of three anti-fuzzing techniques
for developers to protect their programs from malicious fuzzing attempts: SpeedBump,
BranchTrap, and AntiHybrid. The SpeedBump technique aims to slow program execution
during fuzzing. It injects delays to cold paths, which normal executions rarely reach but
that fuzzed executions frequently visit. The BranchTrap technique inserts a large number
of input-sensitive jumps into the program so that any input drift will significantly change
the execution path. This will induce coverage-based fuzzing tools to spend their efforts on
injected bug-free paths instead of on the real ones. The AntiHybrid technique aims to thwart
hybrid fuzzing approaches that incorporate traditional fuzzing methods with dynamic taint
analysis and symbolic execution.
Second, this thesis presents WINNIE, an end-to-end system to address the challenges
on the Windows fuzzing and make the testing more practical. WINNIE contains two
components: a harness generator that automatically synthesizes harnesses from the program
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binary alone, and an efficient Windows fork-server. To construct plausible harnesses, our
harness generator combines both dynamic and static analysis. We run the target program
against several inputs, collect execution traces, and identify interesting functions and libraries
that are suitable for fuzzing. Then, our generator searches the execution traces to collect all
function calls to candidate libraries, and extracts them to form a harness skeleton. Finally,





In this chapter, we introduce the various binary analysis techniques for testing binary such
as fuzzing (§2.1), concolic execution (§2.2), and anti-fuzzing techniques (§2.3).
2.1 Fuzzing
Since the first proposal by Barton Miller in 1990 [1], fuzzing has evolved into a standard
method for automatic program testing and bug finding. Various fuzzing techniques and tools
have been proposed [18, 19, 20, 21, 22], developed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], and used to find a large
number of program bugs [23, 2, 24, 25, 26]. There are continuous efforts to help improve
fuzzing efficiency by developing a more effective feedback loop [27], proposing new OS
primitives [28], and utilizing clusters for large-scale fuzzing [29, 30, 31].
Recently, researchers have been using fuzzing as a general way to explore program
paths with specialties, such as maximizing CPU usage [32], reaching a particular code
location [33], and verifying the deep learning result empirically [34]. All these works result
in a significant improvement to software security and reliability. In this thesis, we focus
on the opposite side of the double-edged sword, where attackers abuse fuzzing techniques
to find zero-day vulnerabilities and thus launch a sophisticated cyber attack. We build
effective methods to hinder attackers on bug finding using FUZZIFICATION, which can
provide developers and trusted researchers time to defeat the adversarial fuzzing effort.
2.1.1 Coverage-Guided Fuzzing
Coverage-guided fuzzing becomes popular especially since AFL [35] has shown its effective-
ness. AFL prioritizes inputs that likely reveal new paths by collecting coverage information
during program execution to assess generated inputs, enabling quick coverage expansion.
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Also, AFLFast [36] uses a Markov chain model to prioritize paths with low reachability, and
CollAFL [37] provides accurate coverage information to mitigate path collisions.
However, fuzzing has a fundamental limitation: it cannot traverse paths beyond narrow-
ranged input constraints (e.g., a magic value). To overcome such a limitation, VUzzer [38]
develops application-aware mutation techniques by performing static and dynamic program
analysis. Steelix [39] recovers correct magic values by collecting comparison progress infor-
mation during program execution. FairFuzz [40] discovers magic values and prevents their
mutations with program analysis and heuristics. Angora [41] adopts taint tracking, shape
and type inference, and a gradient-descent-based search strategy to solve path constraints
efficiently. These approaches, however, can only handle certain types of constraints. In
contrast, WINNIE relies on symbolic execution such that it has a chance to satisfy any kinds
of constraints. In addition, a recent study, T-Fuzz [42], transforms a program itself to cover
more interesting code paths, which could be combined with WINNIE to remove unsolvable
constraints from the program.
2.1.2 Hybrid Fuzzing
The concept of hybrid fuzzing is first proposed by Majumdar and Sen [43]. Later, Driller [44]
demonstrated its effectiveness in DARPA CGC with a refined implementation. In both
studies, the majority of path exploration is offloaded to the fuzzer, while concolic execution
is selectively used to drive execution across the paths that are guarded by narrow-ranged
constraints. Pak [45] also proposes a similar idea, but it is limited to the frontier nodes that
are mainly magic value checks at early execution stages. However, these hybrid fuzzers use
general concolic executors that are not only slow but also incompatible with hybrid fuzzing.




Concolic execution is a path-exploring technique that performs symbolic execution along a
concrete execution path to direct the program to new execution paths. Concolic execution
has been largely adopted for automatic vulnerability finding from source code [46, 47, 48]
to binary [49, 50, 51, 52, 53].
However, concolic execution suffers from the path explosion problem in which the
number of paths to explore grows exponentially with a program size. To mitigate this
problem, SAGE [51, 54] proposes generational search to maximize the number of test cases
in one execution and applies unrelated constraint solving [55]. Dowser [56] uses static
analysis and taint analysis to guide concolic execution and minimizes the number of symbolic
expressions to find buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Mayhem [50] combines forking-based
symbolic execution and re-execution-based symbolic execution to balance performance and
memory usage. In contrast, WINNIE uses (1) fuzzing to explore most paths to avoid the
path explosion problem, (2) generic heuristics (e.g., basic block pruning) without assuming
any specific bug type, and (3) instruction-level re-execution-based symbolic execution for
better performance.
2.3 Anti-fuzzing Techniques
A few studies briefly discuss the concept of anti-fuzzing [57, 58, 59, 60]. Among them,
Göransson et al. evaluated two straightforward techniques, i.e., crash masking to prevent
fuzzers finding crashes and fuzzer detection to hide functionality when being fuzzed [58].
However, attackers can easily detect these methods and bypass them for effective fuzzing.
Our system provides a fine-grained controllable method to slow the fuzzed execution and
introduces effective ways to manipulate the feedback loop to fool fuzzers. We also consider
defensive mechanisms to prevent attackers from removing our anti-fuzzing techniques.
DeAFL [61] provides an way to prevent bug discovery by injecting edges that create
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hash conflicts. However, our method introduces BranchTrap and saturates bitmap structure,
thereby also enforces hash conflicts. Hu et al. proposed to hinder attacks by injecting
provably (but not obviously) non-exploitable bugs to the program, called “Chaff Bugs” [60].
These bugs will confuse bug analysis tools and waste attackers’ effort on exploit gener-
ation. Both chaff bugs and FUZZIFICATION techniques work on close-source programs.
Differently, our techniques hinder bug finding in the first place, eliminating the chance
for an attacker to analyze bugs or construct exploits. Further, both techniques may affect
normal-but-rare usage of the program. However, our methods, at most, introduce slow down





Fuzzing is a software testing technique that aims to find software bugs automatically. It
keeps running the program with randomly generated inputs and waits for bug-exposing
behaviors such as crashing or hanging. It has become a standard practice to detect security
problems in complex, modern software [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Recent research has built
several efficient fuzzing tools [18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28] and found a large number of security
vulnerabilities [23, 2, 24, 25, 26].
Unfortunately, advanced fuzzing techniques can also be used by malicious attackers to
find zero-day vulnerabilities. Recent studies [8, 9] confirm that attackers predominantly
prefer fuzzing tools over others (e.g., reverse engineering) in finding vulnerabilities. For ex-
ample, a survey of information security experts [10] shows that fuzzing techniques discover
4.83 times more bugs than static analysis or manual detection. Therefore, developers might
want to apply anti-fuzzing techniques on their products to hinder fuzzing attempts by attack-
ers, similar in concept to using obfuscation techniques to cripple reverse engineering [11,
12].
In this thesis, we propose a new direction of binary protection, called FUZZIFICATION,
that hinders attackers from effectively finding bugs. Specifically, attackers may still be able
to find bugs from the binary protected by FUZZIFICATION, but with significantly more effort
(e.g., CPU, memory, and time). Thus, developers or other trusted parties who get the original
binary are able to detect program bugs and synthesize patches before attackers widely abuse
them. An effective FUZZIFICATION technique should enable the following three features.




















(a) Overheads of obfuscator/packer















(c) Unique branches over executions
Figure 3.1: Impact of obfuscation techniques on fuzzing. (a) Obfuscation techniques introduce
1.7×-25.0× execution slow down. (b) and (c) fuzzing obfuscated binaries discovers fewer program
paths over time, but gets a similar number of paths over executions.
fixed time; second, the protected program should still run efficiently in normal usage; third,
the protection code should not be easily identified or removed from the protected binary by
straightforward analysis techniques.
No existing technique can achieve all three goals simultaneously. First, software ob-
fuscation techniques, which impede static program analysis by randomizing binary repre-
sentations, seem to be effective in thwarting fuzzing attempts [11, 12]. However, we find
that it falls short of FUZZIFICATION in two ways. Obfuscation introduces unacceptable
overhead to normal program executions. Figure 3.1(a) shows that obfuscation slows the
execution by at least 1.7 times when using UPX [62] and up to 25.0 times when using
LLVM-obfuscator [63]. Also, obfuscation cannot effectively hinder fuzzers in terms of
path exploration. It can slow each fuzzed execution, as shown in Figure 3.1(b), but the
path discovery per execution is almost identical to that of fuzzing the original binary, as
shown in Figure 3.1(c). Therefore, obfuscation is not an ideal FUZZIFICATION technique.
Second, software diversification changes the structure and interfaces of the target application
to distribute diversified versions [64, 65, 66, 67]. For example, the technique of N-version
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software [65] is able to mitigate exploits because attackers often depend on clear knowledge
of the program states. However, software diversification is powerless on hiding the original
vulnerability from the attacker’s analysis; thus it is not a good approach for FUZZIFICATION.
In this thesis, we propose three FUZZIFICATION techniques for developers to protect
their programs from malicious fuzzing attempts: SpeedBump, BranchTrap, and AntiHybrid.
The SpeedBump technique aims to slow program execution during fuzzing. It injects delays
to cold paths, which normal executions rarely reach but that fuzzed executions frequently
visit. The BranchTrap technique inserts a large number of input-sensitive jumps into the
program so that any input drift will significantly change the execution path. This will induce
coverage-based fuzzing tools to spend their efforts on injected bug-free paths instead of
on the real ones. The AntiHybrid technique aims to thwart hybrid fuzzing approaches that
incorporate traditional fuzzing methods with dynamic taint analysis and symbolic execution.
We develop defensive mechanisms to hinder attackers identifying or removing our
techniques from protected binaries. For SpeedBump, instead of calling the sleep function,
we inject randomly synthesized CPU-intensive operations to cold paths and create control-
flow and data-flow dependencies between the injected code and the original code. We reuse
existing binary code to realize BranchTrap to prevent an adversary from identifying the
injected branches.
To evaluate our FUZZIFICATION techniques, we apply them on the LAVA-M dataset
and nine real-world applications, including libjpeg, libpng, libtiff, pcre2, readelf,
objdump, nm, objcopy, and MuPDF. These programs are extensively used to evaluate the
effectiveness of fuzzing tools [68, 69, 70, 71]. Then, we use four popular fuzzers —AFL,
HonggFuzz, VUzzer, and QSYM— to fuzz the original programs and the protected ones for
the same amount of time. On average, fuzzers detect 14.2 times more bugs from the original
binaries and 3.0 times more bugs from the LAVA-M dataset than those from “fuzzified” ones.
At the same time, our FUZZIFICATION techniques decrease the total number of discovered
paths by 70.3%, and maintain user-specified overhead budget. This result shows that our
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FUZZIFICATION techniques successfully decelerate fuzzing performance on vulnerability
discovery. We also perform an analysis to show that data-flow and control-flow analysis
techniques cannot easily disarm our techniques.
3.2 Background and Problem
3.2.1 Fuzzing Techniques
The goal of fuzzing is to automatically detect program bugs. For a given program, a
fuzzer first creates a large number of inputs, either by random mutation or by format-based
generation. Then, it runs the program with these inputs to see whether the execution exposes
unexpected behaviors, such as a crash or an incorrect result. Compared to manual analysis
or static analysis, fuzzing is able to execute the program orders of magnitude more times
and thus can explore more program states to maximize the chance of finding bugs.
Fuzzing with Fast Execution
A straightforward way to improve fuzzing efficiency is to make each execution faster.
Current research highlights several fast execution techniques, including (1) customized
system and hardware to accelerate fuzzed execution and (2) parallel fuzzing to amortize the
absolute execution time in large-scale. Among these techniques, AFL uses the fork server
and persistent mode to avoid the heavy process creation and can accelerate fuzzing by a
factor of two or more [72, 73]. AFL-PT, kAFL, and HonggFuzz utilize hardware features
such as Intel Process Tracing (PT) and Branch Trace Store (BTS) to collect code coverage
efficiently to guide fuzzing [74, 75, 5]. Recently, Xu et al. designed new operating system
primitives, like efficient system calls, to speed up fuzzing on multi-core machines [28].
Fuzzing with Coverage-guidance
Coverage-guided fuzzing collects the code coverage for each fuzzed execution and prioritizes
fuzzing the input that has triggered new coverage. This fuzzing strategy is based on two
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empirical observations: (1) a higher path coverage indicates a higher chance of exposing
bugs; and (2) mutating inputs that ever trigger new paths is likely to trigger another new
path. Most popular fuzzers take code coverage as guidance, like AFL, HonggFuzz, and
LibFuzzer, but with different methods for coverage representation and coverage collection.
Coverage representation. Most fuzzers take basic blocks or branches to represent the
code coverage. For example, HonggFuzz and VUzzer use basic block coverage, while
AFL instead considers the branch coverage, which provides more information about the
program states. Angora [69] combines branch coverage with the call stack to further improve
coverage accuracy. However, the choice of representation is a trade-off between coverage
accuracy and performance, as more fine-grained coverage introduces higher overhead to
each execution and harms the fuzzing efficiency.
Coverage collection. If the source code is available, fuzzers can instrument the target
program during compilation or assembly to record coverage at runtime, like in AFL-LLVM
mode and LibFuzzer. Otherwise, fuzzers have to utilize either static or dynamic binary
instrumentation to achieve a similar purpose, like in AFL-QEMU mode [76]. Also, several
fuzzers leverage hardware features to collect the coverage [74, 75, 5]. Fuzzers usually
maintain their own data structure to store coverage information. For example, AFL and
HonggFuzz use a fixed-size array and VUzzer utilizes a Set data structure in Python to store
their coverage. However, the size of the structure is also a trade-off between accuracy and
performance: an overly small memory cannot capture every coverage change, while an
overly large memory introduces significant overhead. For example, AFL’s performance
drops 30% if the bitmap size is changed from 64KB to 1MB [68].
Fuzzing with Hybrid Approaches
Hybrid approaches are proposed to help solve the limitations of existing fuzzers. First,
fuzzers do not distinguish input bytes with different types (e.g., magic number, length speci-
















Figure 3.2: Workflow of FUZZIFICATION protection. Developers create a protected binary with
FUZZIFICATION techniques and release it to public. Meanwhile, they send the normally compiled
binary to trusted parties. Attackers cannot find many bugs from the protected binary through fuzzing,
while trusted parties can effectively find significantly more bugs and developers can patch them in
time.
flow. In this case, taint analysis is used to help find which input bytes are used to determine
branch conditions, like VUzzer [19]. By focusing on the mutation of these bytes, fuzzers
can quickly find new execution paths. Second, fuzzers cannot easily resolve complicated
conditions, such as comparison with magic value or checksum. Several works [18, 71]
utilize symbolic execution to address this problem, which is good at solving complicated
constraints but incurs high overhead.
3.2.2 FUZZIFICATION Problem
Program developers may want to completely control the bug-finding process, as any bug
leakage can bring attacks and lead to financial loss [77]. They demand exposing bugs by
themselves or by trusted parties, but not by malicious end-users. Anti-fuzzing techniques can
help to achieve that by decelerating unexpected fuzzing attempts, especially from malicious
attackers.
We show the workflow of FUZZIFICATION in Figure 3.2. Developers compile their
code in two versions. One is compiled with FUZZIFICATION techniques to generate a
protected binary, and the other is compiled normally to generate a normal binary. Then,
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Anti-fuzz candidates Effective Generic Efficient Robust
Pack & obfuscation ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔
Bug injection ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗
Fuzzer identification ✔ ✗ ✔ ✗
Emulator bugs ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔
FUZZIFICATION ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Table 3.1: Possible design choices and evaluation with our goals.
developers distribute the protected binary to the public, including normal users and malicious
attackers. Attackers fuzz the protected binary to find bugs. However, with the protection
of FUZZIFICATION techniques, they cannot find as many bugs quickly. At the same time,
developers distribute the normal binary to trusted parties. The trusted parties can launch
fuzzing on the normal binary with the native speed and thus can find more bugs in a timely
manner. Therefore, developers who receive bug reports from trusted parties can fix the bug
before attackers widely abuse it.
Threat Model
We consider motivated attackers who attempt to find software vulnerabilities through state-of-
the-art fuzzing techniques, but with limited resources like computing power (at most similar
resources as trusted parties). Adversaries have the binary protected by FUZZIFICATION and
they have knowledge of our FUZZIFICATION techniques. They can use off-the-shelf binary
analysis techniques to disarm FUZZIFICATION from the protected binary. Adversaries who
have access to the unprotected binary or even to program source code (e.g., inside attackers,
or through code leakage) are out of the scope of this study.
Design Goals and Choices
A FUZZIFICATION technique should achieve the following four goals simultaneously:
• Effective: It should effectively reduce the number of bugs found in the protected
binary, compared to that found in the original binary.
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• Generic: It tackles the fundamental principles of fuzzing and is generally applicable
to most fuzzers.
• Efficient: It introduces minor overhead to the normal program execution.
• Robust: It is resistant to the adversarial analysis trying to remove it from the protected
binary.
With these goals in mind, we examine four design choices for hindering malicious
fuzzing, shown in Table 3.1. Unfortunately, no method can satisfy all goals.
Packing/obfuscation. Software packing and obfuscation are mature techniques against
reverse engineering, both generic and robust. However, they usually introduce higher
performance overhead to program executions, which not only hinders fuzzing, but also
affects the use of normal users.
Bug injection. Injecting arbitrary code snippets that trigger non-exploitable crashes can
cause additional bookkeeping overhead and affect end users in unexpected ways [60].
Fuzzer identification. Detecting the fuzzer process and changing the execution behavior
accordingly can be bypassed easily (e.g., by changing fuzzer name). Also, we cannot
enumerate all fuzzers or fuzzing techniques.
Emulator bugs. Triggering bugs in dynamic instrumentation tools [78, 79, 80] can
interrupt fuzzing [81, 82]. However, it requires strong knowledge of the fuzzer, so it is not
generic.
3.2.3 Design Overview
We propose three FUZZIFICATION techniques – SpeedBump, BranchTrap, and AntiHybrid–
to target each fuzzing technique discussed in §3.2.1. First, SpeedBump injects fine-grained
delay primitives into cold paths that fuzzed executions frequently touch but normal execu-
tions rarely use (§3.3). Second, BranchTrap fabricates a number of input-sensitive branches
to induce the coverage-based fuzzers to waste their efforts on fruitless paths (§3.4). Also,
































Figure 3.3: Overview of FUZZIFICATION process. It first runs the program with given test cases to
get the execution frequency profile. With the profile, it instruments the program with three techniques.
The protected binary is released if it satisfies the overhead budget.
the fuzzer cannot identify interesting inputs that trigger new paths. Third, AntiHybrid
transforms explicit data-flows into implicit ones to prevent data-flow tracking through taint
analysis, and inserts a large number of spurious symbols to trigger path explosion during the
symbolic execution (§3.5).
Figure 3.3 shows an overview of our FUZZIFICATION system. It takes the program
source code, a set of commonly used test cases, and an overhead budget as input and
produces a binary protected by FUZZIFICATION techniques. Note that FUZZIFICATION
relies on developers to determine the appropriate overhead budget, whatever they believe
will create a balance between the functionality and security of their production. 1 We
compile the program to generate a normal binary and run it with the given normal test cases
to collect basic block frequencies. The frequency information tells us which basic blocks are
rarely used by normal executions. 2 Based on the profile, we apply three FUZZIFICATION
techniques to the program and generate a temporary protected binary. 3 We measure the
overhead of the temporary binary with the given normal test cases again. If the overhead
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is over the budget, we go back to step 2 to reduce the slow down to the program, such as
using shorter delay and adding less instrumentation. If the overhead is far below the budget,
we increase the overhead accordingly. Otherwise, 4 we generate the protected binary.
3.3 SpeedBump: Amplifying Delay in Fuzzing
We propose a technique called SpeedBump to slow the fuzzed execution while minimizing
the effect to normal executions. Our observation is that the fuzzed execution frequently falls
into paths such as error-handling (e.g., wrong MAGIC bytes) that the normal executions
rarely visit. We call them the cold paths. Injecting delays in cold paths will significantly
slow fuzzed executions but will not affect regular executions that much. We first identify
cold paths from normal executions with the given test cases and then inject crafted delays
into least-executed code paths. Our tool automatically determines the number of code paths
to inject delays and the length of each delay so that the protected binary has overhead under
the user-defined budget during normal executions.
Basic block frequency profiling. FUZZIFICATION generates a basic block frequency
profile to identify cold paths. The profiling process follows three steps. First, we instrument
the target programs to count visited basic blocks during the execution and generate a
binary for profiling. Second, with the user-provided test cases, we run this binary and
collect the basic blocks visited by each input. Third, FUZZIFICATION analyzes the collected
information to identify basic blocks that are rarely executed or never executed by valid
inputs. These blocks are treated as cold paths in delay injection.
Our profiling does not require the given test cases to cover 100% of all legitimate
paths, but just to trigger the commonly used functionalities. We believe this is a practical
assumption, as experienced developers should have a set of test cases covering most of
the functionalities (e.g., regression test-suites). Optionally, if developers can provide a set
of test cases that trigger uncommon features, our profiling results will be more accurate.
For example, for applications parsing well-known file formats (e.g., readelf parses ELF
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binaries), collecting valid/invalid dataset is straightforward.
Configurable delay injection. We perform the following two steps repeatedly to determine
the set of code blocks to inject delays and the length of each delay:
• We start by injecting a 30ms delay to 3% of the least-executed basic blocks in the test
executions. We find that this setting is close enough to the final evaluation result.
• We measure the overhead of the generated binary. If it does not exceed the user-
defined overhead budget, we go to the previous step to inject more delay into more
basic blocks. Otherwise, we use the delay in the previous round as the final result.
Our SpeedBump technique is especially useful for developers who generally have a good
understanding of their applications, as well as the requirements for FUZZIFICATION. We
provide five options that developers can use to finely tune SpeedBump’s effect. Specifically,
MAX_OVERHEAD defines the overhead budget. Developers can specify any value as long as they
feel comfortable with the overhead. DELAY_LENGTH specifies the range of delays. We use
10ms to 300ms in the evaluation. INCLUDE_INCORRECT determines whether or not to inject
delays to error-handling basic blocks (i.e., locations that are only executed by invalid inputs),
which is enabled by default. INCLUDE_NON_EXEC and NON_EXEC_RATIO specify whether to
inject delays into how ever many basic blocks are never executed during test execution. This
is useful when developers do not have a large set of test cases.
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the impact of different options on protecting the readelf binary
with SpeedBump. We collect 1,948 ELF files on the Debian system as valid test cases and
use 600 text and image files as invalid inputs. Figure 3.4(a) shows the maximum ratio of
basic blocks that we can inject delay into while introducing overhead less than 1% and 3%.
For a 1ms delay, we can instrument 11% of the least-executed basic blocks for a 1% overhead
budget and 12% for 3% overhead. For a 120ms delay, we cannot inject any blocks for 1%
overhead and can inject only 2% of the cold paths for 3% overhead. Figure 3.4(b) shows
the actual performance of AFL-QEMU when it fuzzes SpeedBump-protected binaries. The




































Figure 3.4: Protecting readelf with different overhead budgets. While satisfying the overhead
budget, (a) demonstrates the maximum ratio of instrumentation for each delay length, and (b) displays
the execution speed of AFL-QEMU on protected binaries.
with a 30ms delay slows the fuzzer by more than 50×. Therefore, we use 30ms and the
corresponding 3% instrumentation as the starting point.
3.3.1 Analysis-resistant Delay Primitives
As attackers may use program analysis to identify and remove simple delay primitives
(e.g., calling sleep), we design robust primitives that involve arithmetic operations and are
connected with the original code base. Our primitives are based on CSmith [83], which can
generate random and bug-free code snippets with refined options. For example, CSmith
can generate a function that takes parameters, performs arithmetic operations, and returns a
specific type of value. We modified CSmith to generate code that has data dependencies and
code dependencies to the original code. Specifically, we pass a variable from the original
code to the generated code as an argument, make a reference from the generated code to
the original one, and use the return value to modify a global variable of the original code.
Figure 3.5 shows an example of our delay primitives. It declares a local variable PASS_VAR
and modifies global variables GLOBAL_VAR1 and GLOBAL_VAR2. In this way, we introduce
data-flow dependency between the original code and the injected code (line 6, 9 and 12),
and change the program state without affecting the original program. Although the code is
randomly generated, it is tightly coupled with the original code via data-flow and control-
flow dependencies. Therefore, it is non-trivial for common binary analysis techniques,
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1 //Predefined global variables
2 int32_t GLOBAL_VAR1 = 1, GLOBAL_VAR2 = 2;
3 //Randomly generated code
4 int32_t * func(int32_t p6) {
5 int32_t *l0[1000];
6 GLOBAL_VAR1 = 0x4507L; // affect global var.
7 int32_t *l1 = g8[1][0];
8 for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++)
9 l0[i] = p6; // affect local var from argv.
10 (*g7) = func2(g6++);
11 (*g5) |= ~(!func3(**g4 = ~0UL));
12 return l1; // affect global var.
13 }
14 //Inject above function for delay
15 int32_t PASS_VAR = 20;
16 GLOBAL_VAR2 = func(PASS_VAR);
Figure 3.5: Example delay primitive. Function func updates global variables to build data-flow
dependency with original program.
like dead-code elimination, to distinguish it from the original code. We repeatedly run the
modified CSmith to find appropriate code snippets that take a specific time (e.g., 10ms) for
delay injection.
Safety of delay primitives. We utilize the safety checks from CSmith and FUZZIFICATION
to guarantee that the generated code is bug-free. First, we use CSmith’s default safety checks,
which embed a collection of tests in the code, including integer, type, pointer, effect, array,
initialization, and global variable. For example, CSmith conducts pointer analysis to detect
any access to an out-of-scope stack variable or null pointer dereference, uses explicit
initialization to prevent uninitialized usage, applies math wrapper to prevent unexpected
integer overflow, and analyzes qualifiers to avoid any mismatch. Second, FUZZIFICATION
also has a separate step to help detect bad side effects (e.g., crashes) in delay primitives.
Specifically, we run the code 10 times with fixed arguments and discard it if the execution
shows any error. Finally, FUZZIFICATION embeds the generated primitives with the same
fixed argument to avoid errors.
Fuzzers aware of error-handling blocks. Recent fuzzing proposals, like VUzzer [19] and
T-Fuzz [70], identify error-handling basic blocks through profiling and exclude them from the
code coverage calculation to avoid repetitive executions. This may affect the effectiveness
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of our SpeedBump technique, which uses a similar profiling step to identify cold paths.
Fortunately, the cold paths from SpeedBump include not only error-handling basic blocks,
but also rarely executed functional blocks. Further, we use similar methods to identify
error-handling blocks from the cold paths and provide developers the option to choose not
to instrument these blocks. Thus, our FUZZIFICATION will focus on instrumenting rarely
executed functional blocks to maximize its effectiveness.
3.4 BranchTrap: Blocking Coverage Feedback
Code coverage information is widely used by fuzzers to find and prioritize interesting
inputs [2, 3, 5]. We can make these fuzzers diligent fools if we insert a large number
of conditional branches whose conditions are sensitive to slight input changes. When
the fuzzing process falls into these branch traps, coverage-based fuzzers will waste their
resources to explore (a huge number of) worthless paths. Therefore, we propose the
technique of BranchTrap to deceive coverage-based fuzzers by misleading or blocking the
coverage feedback.
3.4.1 Fabricating Fake Paths on User Input
The first method of BranchTrap is to fabricate a large number of conditional branches and
indirect jumps, and inject them into the original program. Each fabricated conditional branch
relies on some input bytes to determine to take the branch or not, while indirect jumps
calculate their targets based on user input. Thus, the program will take different execution
paths even when the input slightly changes. Once a fuzzed execution triggers the fabricated
branch, the fuzzer will set a higher priority to mutate that input, resulting in the detection
of more fake paths. In this way, the fuzzer will keep wasting its resources (i.e., CPU and
memory) to inspect fruitless but bug-free fake paths.
To effectively induce the fuzzers focusing on fake branches, we consider the following
four design aspects. First, BranchTrap should fabricate a sufficient number of fake paths to
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affect the fuzzing policy. Since the fuzzer generates various variants from one interesting
input, fake paths should provide different coverage and be directly affected by the input so
that the fuzzer will keep unearthing the trap. Second, the injected new paths introduce mini-
mal overhead to regular executions. Third, the paths in BranchTrap should be deterministic
regarding user input, which means that the same input should go through the same path.
The reason is that some fuzzers can detect and ignore non-deterministic paths (e.g., AFL
ignores one input if two executions with it take different paths). Finally, BranchTrap cannot
be easily identified or removed by adversaries.
A trivial implementation of BranchTrap is to inject a jump table and use some input
bytes as the index to access the table (i.e., different input values result in different jump
targets). However, this approach can be easily nullified by simple adversarial analysis. We
design and implement a robust BranchTrap with code-reuse techniques, similar in concept
to the well-known return-oriented programming (ROP) [84].
BranchTrap with CFG Distortion
To harden BranchTrap, we diversify the return addresses of each injected branch according
to the user input. Our idea is inspired by ROP, which reuses existing code for malicious
attacks by chaining various small code snippets. Our approach can heavily distort the
program control-flow and makes nullifying BranchTrap more challenging for adversaries.
The implementation follows three steps. First, BranchTrap collects function epilogues from
the program assembly (generated during program compilation). Second, function epilogues
with the same instruction sequence are grouped into one jump table. Third, we rewrite the
assembly so that the function will retrieve one of several equivalent epilogues from the
corresponding jump table to realize the original function return, using some input bytes as
the jump table index. As we replace the function epilogue with a functional equivalent, it
guarantees the identical operations as the original program.
Figure 3.6 depicts the internal of the BranchTrap implementation at runtime. For one
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epilogue
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 gadgetN
 ...
          = arg1^arg2index
 jmp  table[index]
...
Figure 3.6: BranchTrap by reusing the existing ROP gadgets in the original binary. Among
functionally equivalent gadgets, BranchTrap picks the one based on function arguments.
function, BranchTrap 1 calculates the XORed value of all arguments. BranchTrap uses this
value for indexing the jump table (i.e., candidates for epilogue address). 2 BranchTrap uses
this value as the index to visit the jump table and obtains the concrete address of the epilogue.
To avoid out-of-bounds array access, BranchTrap divides the XORed value by the length of
the jump table and takes the remainder as the index. 3 After determining the target jump
address, the control-flow is transferred to the gadget (e.g., the same pop rbp; pop r15; ret
gadget). 4 Finally, the execution returns to the original return address.
The ROP-based BranchTrap has three benefitfuzz:
• Effective: Control-flow is constantly and sensitively changed together with the user
input mutation; thus FUZZIFICATION can introduce a sufficient number of unproduc-
tive paths and make coverage feedback less effective. Also, BranchTrap guarantees
the same control-flow on the same input (i.e., deterministic path) so that the fuzzer
will not ignore these fake paths.
• Low overhead: BranchTrap introduces low overhead to normal user operations (e.g.,
less than 1% overhead) due to its lightweight operations (Store argument; XOR;
Resolve jump address; Jump to gadget).
• Robust: The ROP-based design significantly increases the complexity for an adver-
sary to identify or patch the binary. We evaluate the robustness of BranchTrap against
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adversarial analysis in §3.6.4.
3.4.2 Saturating Fuzzing State
The second method of BranchTrap is to saturate the fuzzing state, which blocks the fuzzers
from learning the progress in the code coverage. Different from the first method, which
induces fuzzers focusing on fruitless inputs, our goal here is to prevent the fuzzers from
finding real interesting ones. To achieve this, BranchTrap inserts a massive number of
branches to the program, and exploits the coverage representation mechanism of each fuzzer
to mask new findings. BranchTrap is able to introduce an extensive number (e.g., 10K to
100K) of deterministic branches to some rarely visited basic blocks. Once the fuzzer reaches
these basic blocks, its coverage table will quickly fill up. In this way, most of the newly
discovered paths in the following executions will be treated as visited, and thus the fuzzer
will discard the input that in fact explores interesting paths. For example, AFL maintains a
fixed-size bitmap (i.e., 64KB) to track edge coverage. By inserting a large number of distinct
branches, we significantly increase the probability of bitmap collision and thus reduce the
coverage inaccuracy.
Figure 3.7(a) demonstrates the impact of bitmap saturation on fuzzing readelf. Ap-
parently, a more saturated bitmap leads to fewer path discoveries. Starting from an empty
bitmap, AFL identifies over 1200 paths after 10 hours of fuzzing. For the 40% saturation rate,
it only finds around 950 paths. If the initial bitmap is highly filled, such as 80% saturation,
AFL detects only 700 paths with the same fuzzing effort.
Fuzzers with collision mitigation. Recent fuzzers, like CollAFL [68], propose to mitigate
the coverage collision issue by assigning a unique identifier to each path coverage (i.e.,
branch in case of CollAFL). However, we argue that these techniques will not effectively
undermine the strength of our BranchTrap technique on saturating coverage storage for
two reasons. First, current collision mitigation techniques require program source code to
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(b) Impact of different number of branches
Figure 3.7: Collision during the fuzzing. (a) AFL performance with different initial bitmap
saturation. (b) Impact on bitmap with different number of branches.
attackers cannot obtain the program source code or the original binary – they only have a
copy of the protected binary, which makes it significantly more challenging to apply similar
ID-assignment algorithms. Second, these fuzzers still have to adopt a fixed size storage of
coverage because of the overhead of large storage. Therefore, if we can saturate 90% of the
storage, CollAFL can only utilize the remaining 10% for ID-assignment; thus the fuzzing
performance will be significantly affected.
3.4.3 Design Factors of BranchTrap
We provide developers an interface to configure ROP-based BranchTrap and coverage
saturation for optimal protection. First, the number of generated fake paths of ROP-based
BranchTrap is configurable. BranchTrap depends on the number of functions to make
a distorted control-flow. Therefore, injected BranchTrap is effective when the original
program contains plenty of functions. For binaries with fewer functions, we provide an
option for developers to split existing basic blocks into multiple ones, each connected with
conditional branches. Second, the size of the injected branches for saturating the coverage is
also controllable. Figure 3.7(b) shows how the bitmap can be saturated in AFL by increasing
the branch number. It clearly shows that more branches can fill up more bitmap entries. For
example, 100K branches can fill up more than 90% of a bitmap entry. Injecting a massive
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number of branches into the program increases the output binary size. When we inject 100k
branches, the size of the protected binary is 4.6MB larger than the original binary. To avoid
high code size overhead, we inject a huge number of branches into only one or two of the
most rarely executed basic blocks. As long as one fuzzed execution reaches such branches,
the coverage storage will be filled and the following fuzzing will find fewer interesting
inputs.
3.5 AntiHybrid: Thwarting Hybrid Fuzzers
A hybrid fuzzing method utilizes either symbolic execution or dynamic taint analysis to
improve fuzzing efficiency. Symbolic (or concolic) execution is good at solving complicated
branch conditions (e.g., magic number and checksum), and therefore can help fuzzers
bypass these hard-to-mutate roadblocks. DTA (Dynamic Taint Analysis) helps find input
bytes that are related to branch conditions. Recently, several hybrid fuzzing methods have
been proposed and successfully discovered security-critical bugs. For example, Driller [18]
adapted selective symbolic execution and proved its efficacy during the DARPA Cyber Grand
Challenge (CGC). VUzzer [19] utilized dynamic taint analysis to identify path-critical input
bytes for effective input mutation. QSYM [71] suggested a fast concolic execution technique
that can be scalable on real-world applications.
Nevertheless, hybrid approaches have well-known weaknesses. First, both symbolic
execution and taint analysis consume a large amount of resources such as CPU and memory,
limiting them to analyzing simple programs. Second, symbolic execution is limited by
the path explosion problem. If complex operation is required for processing symbols, the
symbolic execution engine has to exhaustively explore and evaluate all execution states; then,
most of the symbolic execution engines fail to run to the end of the execution path. Third,
DTA analysis has difficulty in tracking implicit data dependencies, such as covert channels,
control channels, or timing-based channels. For example, to cover data dependency through
a control channel, the DTA engine has to aggressively propagate the taint attribute to any
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1 char input[] = ...; /* user input */
2 int value = ...; /* user input */
3
4 // 1. using implicit data-flow to copy input to antistr
5 // original code: if (!strcmp(input, "condition!")) { ... }
6 char antistr[strlen(input)];
7 for (int i = 0; i<strlen(input); i++){
8 int ch = 0, temp = 0, temp2 = 0;
9 for (int j = 0; j<8; j++){
10 temp = input[i];
11 temp2 = temp & (1<<j);
12 if (temp2 != 0) ch |= 1<<j;
13 }
14 antistr[i] = ch;
15 }
16 if (!strcmp(antistr, "condition!")) { ... }
17
18 // 2. exploding path constraints
19 // original code: if (value == 12345)
20 if (CRC_LOOP(value) == OUTPUT_CRC) { ... }
Figure 3.8: Example of AntiHybrid techniques. We use implicit data-flow (line 6-15) to copy
strings to hinder dynamic taint analysis. We inject hash function around equal comparison (line 20)
to cripple symbolic execution engine.
variable after a conditional branch, making the analysis more expensive and the result less
accurate.
Introducing implicit data-flow dependencies. We transform the explicit data-flows in
the original program into implicit data-flows to hinder taint analysis. FUZZIFICATION first
identifies branch conditions and interesting information sinks (e.g., strcmp) and then injects
data-flow transformation code according to the variable type. Figure 3.8 shows an example
application of AntiHybrid, where array input is used to decide branch condition and strcmp
is an interesting sink function. Therefore, FUZZIFICATION uses implicit data-flows to copy
the array (line 6-15) and replaces the original variable to the new one (line 16). Due to the
transformed implicit data-flow, the DTA technique cannot identify the correct input bytes
that affect the branch condition at line 16.
Implicit data-flow hinders data-flow analysis that tracks direct data propagation. How-
ever, it cannot prevent data dependency inference through differential analysis. For example,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ditions through pattern matching, and thus can bypass the implicit data-flow transformation.
However, RedQueen requires the branch condition value to be explicitly shown in the input,
which can be easily fooled through simple data modification (e.g., adding the same constant
value to both operands of the comparison).
Exploding path constraints. To hinder hybrid fuzzers using symbolic execution, FUZZIFICATION
injects multiple code chunks to intentionally trigger path explosions. Specifically, we re-
place each comparison instruction by comparing the hash values of the original comparison
operands. We adopt the hash function because symbolic execution cannot easily determine
the original operand with the given hash value. As hash functions usually introduce non-
negligible overhead to program execution, we utilize the lightweight cyclic redundancy
checking (CRC) loop iteration to transform the branch condition to reduce performance over-
head. Although theoretically CRC is not as strong as hash functions for hindering symbolic
execution, it also introduces significant slow down. Figure 3.8 shows an example of the
path explosion instrumentation. To be specific, FUZZIFICATION changes the original con-
dition (value == 12345) to (CRC_LOOP(value) == OUTPUT_CRC) (at line 20). If symbolic
execution decides to solve the constraint of the CRC, it will mostly return a timeout error
due to the complicated mathematics. For example, QSYM, a state-of-the-art fast symbolic
execution engine, is armed with many heuristics to scale on real-world applications. When
QSYM first tries to solve the complicated constraint that we injected, it will fail due to the
timeout or path explosion. Once injected codes are run by the fuzzer multiple times, QSYM
identifies the repetitive basic blocks (i.e., injected hash function) and performs basic block
pruning, which decides not to generate a further constraint from it to assign resources into
a new constraint. After that, QSYM will not explore the condition with the injected hash
function; thus, the code in the branch can be explored rarely.
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Tasks Target AFL HonggFuzz QSym VUzzer
Coverage 8 binaries O,S,B,H,A O,S,B,H,A O,S,B,H,A –
MuPDF O,A O,A O,A –
Crash 4 binaries O,A O,A O,A –
LAVA-M O,A O,A O,A O,A
Table 3.3: Experiments summary. Protection optionfuzz: Original, SpeedBump, BranchTrap,
AntiHybrid, All. We use 4 binutils binaries, 4 binaries from Google OSS project and MuPDF to
measure the code coverage. We use binutils binaries and LAVA-M programs to measure the number
of unique crashes.
3.6 Evaluation
We evaluate our FUZZIFICATION techniques to understand their effectiveness on hindering
fuzzers from exploring program code paths (§3.6.1) and detecting bugs (§3.6.2), their
practicality of protecting real-world large programs (§3.6.3), and their robustness against
adversarial analysis techniques (§3.6.4).
Implementation. Our FUZZIFICATION framework is implemented in a total of 6,559 lines
of Python code and 758 lines of C++ code. We implement the SpeedBump technique as
an LLVM pass and use it to inject delays into cold blocks during the compilation. For
the BranchTrap, we analyze the assembly code and modify it directly. For the AntiHybrid
technique, we use an LLVM pass to introduce the path explosion and utilize a python
script to automatically inject implicit data-flows. Currently, our system supports all three
FUZZIFICATION techniques on 64bit applications, and is able to protect 32bit applications
except for the ROP-based BranchTrap.
Experimental setup. We evaluate FUZZIFICATION against four state-of-the-art fuzzers
that work on binaries, specifically, AFL in QEMU mode, HonggFuzz in Intel-PT mode,
VUzzer 321, and QSYM with AFL-QEMU. We set up the evaluation on two machines, one
with Intel Xeon CPU E7-8890 v4@2.20GHz, 192 processors and 504 GB of RAM, and
1We also tried to use VUzzer64 to fuzz different programs, but it did not find any crashes even for any









































































































































































































































































































































Category Option Design Choice
SpeedBump
max_overhead 2%








Table 3.4: Our configuration values for the evaluation.
another with Intel Xeon CPU E7-4820@2.00GHz, 32 processors and 128 GB of RAM.
To get reproducible results, we tried to eliminate the non-deterministic factors from
fuzzers: we disable the address space layout randomization of the experiment machine
and force the deterministic mode for AFL. However, we have to leave the randomness in
HonggFuzz and VUzzer, as they do not support deterministic fuzzing. Second, we used
the same set of test cases for basic block profiling in FUZZIFICATION, and fed the same
seed inputs for different fuzzers. Third, we used identical FUZZIFICATION techniques and
configurations when we conducted code instrumentation and binary rewriting for each
target application. Last, we pre-generated FUZZIFICATION primitives (e.g., SpeedBump
codes for 10ms to 300ms and BranchTrap codes with deterministic branches), and used the
primitives for all protections. Note that developers should use different primitives for the
actual releasing binary to avoid code pattern matching analysis.
Target applications. We select the LAVA-M data set [86] and nine real-world applications
as the fuzzing targets, which are commonly used to evaluate the performance of fuzzers [69,
68, 28, 19]. The nine real-world programs include four applications from the Google
fuzzer test-suite [30], four programs from the binutils [87] (shown in Table 3.2), and the
PDF reader MuPDF. We perform two sets of experiments on these binaries, summarized in
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Table 3.3. First, we fuzz nine real-world programs with three fuzzers (all except VUzzer2)
to measure the impact of FUZZIFICATION on finding code paths. Specifically, we compile
eight real-world programs (all except MuPDF) with five different settings: original (no
protection), SpeedBump, BranchTrap, AntiHybrid, and a combination of three techniques
(full protection). We compile MuPDF with two settings for simplicity: no protection and
full protection. Second, we use three fuzzers to fuzz four binutils programs and all four
fuzzers to fuzz LAVA-M programs to evaluate the impact of FUZZIFICATION on unique bug
finding. All fuzzed programs in this step are compiled in two versions: with no protection
and with full protection. We compiled the LAVA-M program to a 32bit version in order to
be comparable with previous research. Table 3.4 shows the configuration of each technique
used in our compilation. We changed the fuzzer’s timeout if the binaries cannot start with
the default timeout (e.g., 1000 ms for AFL-QEMU).
Evaluation metric. We use two metrics to measure the effectiveness of FUZZIFICATION:
code coverage in terms of discovered real paths, and unique crashes. Real path is the
execution path shown in the original program, excluding the fake ones introduced by
BranchTrap. We further excluded the real paths triggered by seed inputs so that we can
focus on the ones discovered by fuzzers. Unique crash is measured as the input that can
make the program crash with a distinct real path. We filter out duplicate crashes that are
defined in AFL [88] and are widely used by other fuzzers [69, 39].
3.6.1 Reducing Code Coverage
Impact on Normal Fuzzers
We measure the impact of FUZZIFICATION on reducing the number of real paths against
AFL-QEMU and HonggFuzz-Intel-PT. Figure 3.9 shows the 72-hour fuzzing result from
AFL-QEMU on different programs with five protection settings. The result of HonggFuzz-
2Due to time limit, we only use VUzzer 32 to finding bugs from LAVA-M programs. We plan to do other
























































































































































































































































































































































In summary, with all three techniques, FUZZIFICATION can reduce discovered real
paths by 76% to AFL, and by 67% to HonggFuzz, on average. For AFL, the reduction
rate varies from 14% to 97% and FUZZIFICATION reduces over 90% of path discovery for
libtiff, pcre2 and readelf. For HonggFuzz, the reduction rate is between 38% to 90%
and FUZZIFICATION only reduces more than 90% of paths for pcre2. As FUZZIFICATION
automatically determines the details for each protection to satisfy the overhead budget, its
effect varies for different programs.
Table 3.5 shows the effect of each technique on hindering path discovery. Among them,
SpeedBump achieves the best protection against normal fuzzers, followed by BranchTrap
and AntiHybrid. Interestingly, although AntiHybrid is developed to hinder hybrid ap-
proaches, it also helps reduce the discovered paths in normal fuzzers. We believe this is
mainly caused by the slow down in fuzzed executions.
We measured the overhead by different FUZZIFICATION techniques, on program size
and execution speed. The result is given in Table 3.2. In summary, FUZZIFICATION satisfies
the user-specified overhead budget, but shows relatively high space overhead. On average,
binaries armed with FUZZIFICATION are 62.1% larger than the original ones. The extra
code mainly comes from the BranchTrap technique, which inserts massive branches to
achieve bitmap saturation. Note that the extra code size is almost the same across different
programs. Therefore, the size overhead is high for small programs, but is negligible for large
applications. For example, the size overhead is less than 1% for LibreOffice applications,
as we show in Table 3.7. Further, BranchTrap is configurable, and developers may inject a
smaller number of fake branches to small programs to avoid large-size overhead.
Analysis on less effective results. FUZZIFICATION shows less effectiveness on protecting
the libjpeg application. Specifically, it decreases the number of real paths on libjpeg
by 13% to AFL and by 37% to HonggFuzz, whereas the average reduction is 76% and
67%, respectively. We analyzed FUZZIFICATION on libjpeg and find that SpeedBump and
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SpeedBump BranchTrap AntiHybrid All
AFL-QEMU -66% -23% -18% -74%
HonggFuzz (PT) -44% -14% -7% -61%
QSym (AFL-QEMU) -59% -58% -67% -80%
Average -56% -31% -30% -71%
Table 3.5: Reduction of discovered paths by FUZZIFICATION techniques. Each value is an
average of the fuzzing result from eight real-world programs, as shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10.
BranchTrap cannot effectively protect libjpeg. Specifically, these two techniques only
inject nine basic blocks within the user-specified overhead budget (2% for SpeedBump
and 2% for BranchTrap), which is less than 0.1% of all basic blocks. To address this
problem, developers may increase the overhead budget so that FUZZIFICATION can insert
more roadblocks to protect the program.
Impact on Hybrid Fuzzers
We also evaluated FUZZIFICATION’s impact on code coverage against QSYM, a hybrid
fuzzer that utilizes symbolic execution to help fuzzing. Figure 3.10 shows the number of
real paths discovered by QSYM from the original and protected binaries. Overall, with
all three techniques, FUZZIFICATION can reduce the path coverage by 80% to QSYM on
average, and shows consistent high effectiveness on all tested programs. Specifically, the
reduction rate varies between 66% (objdump) to 90% (readelf). The result of libjpeg shows
an interesting pattern: QSYM finds a large number of real paths from the original binary
in the last 8 hours, but it did not get the same result from any protected binary. Table 3.5
shows that AntiHybrid achieves the best effect (67% path reduction) against hybrid fuzzers,
followed by SpeedBump (59%) and BranchTrap (58%).
Comparison with normal fuzzing result. QSYM uses efficient symbolic execution to help
find new paths in fuzzing, and therefore it is able to discover 44% more real paths than AFL
from original binaries. As we expect, AntiHybrid shows the most impact on QSYM (67%










































(a) AFL-QEMU (b) HonggFuzz (Intel-PT) (c) QSym (AFL-QEMU)
Original
Fuzzified
Figure 3.11: Crashes found by different fuzzers from binutils programs. Each program is






























(a) VUzzer (b) QSym (AFL-QEMU)
Original
Fuzzified
Figure 3.12: Bugs found by VUzzer and QSYM from LAVA-M dataset. HonggFuzz discovers
three bugs from the original uniq. AFL does not find any bug.
techniques, QSYM shows less advantage over normal fuzzers, reduced from 44% to 12%.
3.6.2 Hindering Bug Finding
We measure the number of unique crashes that fuzzers find from the original and protected
binaries. Our evaluation first fuzzes four binutils programs and LAVA-M applications with
three fuzzers (all but VUzzer). Then we fuzz LAVA-M programs with VUzzer, where we
compiled them into 32bit versions and excluded the protection of ROP-based BranchTrap,
which is not implemented yet for 32bit programs.
Impact on Real-World Applications
Figure 3.11 shows the total number of unique crashes discovered by three fuzzers in 72 hours.
Overall, FUZZIFICATION reduces the number of discovered crashes by 93%, specifically,
by 88% to AFL, by 98% to HonggFuzz, and by 94% to QSYM. If we assume a consistent
crash-discovery rate along the fuzzing process, fuzzers have to take 40 times more effort
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to detect the same number of crashes from the protected binaries. As the crash-discovery
rate usually reduces over time in real-world fuzzing, fuzzers will have to take much more
effort. Therefore, FUZZIFICATION can effectively hinder fuzzers and makes them spend
significantly more time discovering the same number of crash-inducing inputs.
Impact on LAVA-M Dataset
Compared with other tested binaries, LAVA-M programs are smaller in size and simpler
in operation. If we inject a 1ms delay on 1% of rarely executed basic block on who binary,
the program will suffer a slow down of more than 40 times. To apply FUZZIFICATION
on the LAVA-M dataset, we allow higher overhead budget and apply more fine-grained
FUZZIFICATION. Specifically, we used tiny delay primitives (i.e., 10 µs to 100 µs), tuned
the ratio of basic block instrumentation from 1% to 0.1%, reduced the number of applied
AntiHybrid components, and injected smaller deterministic branches to reduce the code
size overhead. Table 3.6 shows the run-time and space overhead of the generated LAVA-M
programs with FUZZIFICATION techniques.
After fuzzing the protected binaries for 10 hours, AFL-QEMU does not find any crash.
HonggFuzz detects three crashes from the original uniq binary and cannot find any crash
from any protected binary. Figure 3.12 illustrates the fuzzing result of VUzzer and QSYM.
Overall, FUZZIFICATION can reduce 56% of discovered bugs to VUzzer and 78% of dis-
covered bugs to QSYM. Note that the fuzzing result on the original binaries is different
from the ones reported in the original papers [71, 19] for several reason: VUzzer and QSYM
cannot eliminate non-deterministic steps during fuzzing; we run the AFL part of each tool
in QEMU mode; LAVA-M dataset is updated with several bug fixes3.
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who uniq base64 md5sum Average
Overhead (Size)
17.1% 220.6% 220.0% 210.7% 167.1%
(0.3M) (0.3M) (0.3M) (0.3M)
Overhead (CPU) 22.7% 13.2% 21.1% 6.5% 15.9%
Table 3.6: Overhead of FUZZIFICATION on LAVA-M binaries. The overhead is higher as LAVA-
M binaries are relatively small (e.g., ≈ 200KB).
Category Program Version OverheadSize CPU
LibreOffice
Writer < 1% (+1.3 MB) 0.4%
Calc 6.2 < 1% (+1.3 MB) 0.4%
Impress < 1% (+1.3 MB) 0.2%
Music Player Clementine 1.3 4.3% (+1.3 MB) 0.5%
PDF Reader MuPDF 1.13 4.1% (+1.3 MB) 2.2%
Image Viewer Nomacs 3.10 21% (+1.2 MB) 0.7%
Average 5.4% 0.73%
Table 3.7: FUZZIFICATION on GUI applications. The CPU overhead is calculated on the applica-
tion launching time. Due to the fixed code injection, code size overhead is negligible for these large
applications.
3.6.3 Anti-fuzzing on Realistic Applications
To understand the practicality of FUZZIFICATION on large and realistic applications, we
choose six programs that have a graphical user interface (GUI) and depend on tens of
libraries. As fuzzing large and GUI programs is a well-known challenging problem, our
evaluation here focuses on measuring the overhead of FUZZIFICATION techniques and
the functionality of protected programs. When applying the SpeedBump technique, we
have to skip the basic block profiling step due to the lack of command-line interface (CLI)
support (e.g., readelf parses ELF file and displays results in command line); thus, we only
insert slow down primitives into error-handling routines. For the BranchTrap technique, we
choose to inject massive fake branches into basic blocks near the entry point. In this way,
the program execution will always pass the injected component so that we can measure
3httpfuzz://github.com/panda-re/lava/search?q=bugfix&type=Commits
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Pattern Control Data Manual
matching analysis analysis analysis
SpeedBump ✔ ✔ ✔ -
BranchTrap ✔ ✔ ✔ -
AntiHybrid - ✔ ✔ -
Table 3.8: Defense against adversarial analysis. ✔ indicates that the FUZZIFICATION technique
is resistant to that adversarial analysis.
runtime overhead correctly. We apply the AntiHybrid technique directly.
For each protected application, we first manually run it with multiple inputs, including
given test cases, and confirm that FUZZIFICATION does not affect the program’s original
functionality. For example, MuPDF successfully displays, edits, saves, and prints all tested
PDF documents. Second, we measure the code size and runtime overhead of the protected
binaries for given test cases. As shown in Table 3.7, on average, FUZZIFICATION introduces
5.4% code size overhead and 0.73% runtime overhead. Note that the code size overhead
is much smaller than that of previous programs (i.e., 62.1% for eight relatively small
programs Table 3.2 and over 100% size overhead for simple LAVA-M programs Table 3.6).
Anti-fuzzing on MuPDF. We also evaluated the effectiveness of FUZZIFICATION on
protecting MuPDF against three fuzzers – AFL, HonggFuzz, and QSYM– as MuPDF supports
the CLI interface through the tool called “mutool.” We compiled the binary with the
same parameter shown in Table 3.4 and performed basic block profiling using the CLI
interface. After 72-hours of fuzzing, no fuzzer finds any bug from MuPDF. Therefore, we
instead compare the number of real paths between the original binary and the protected
one. As shown in Figure 3.13, FUZZIFICATION reduces the total paths by 55% on average,
specifically, by 77% to AFL, by 36% to HonggFuzz, and 52% to QSYM. Therefore, we






















Figure 3.13: Testing MuPDF. Paths discovered by different fuzzers from the original MuPDF and the
one protected by three FUZZIFICATION techniques.
3.6.4 Evaluating Best-effort Countermeasures
We evaluate the robustness of FUZZIFICATION techniques against off-the-shelf program
analysis techniques that adversaries may use to reverse our protections. However, the
experiment results do not particularly indicate that FUZZIFICATION is robust against strong
adversaries with incomparable computational resources.
Table 3.8 shows the analysis we covered and summarizes the evaluation result. First,
attackers may search particular code patterns from the protected binary in order to identify
injected protection code. To test anti-fuzzing against pattern matching, we examine a number
of code snippets that are repeatedly used throughout the protected binaries. We found that
the injected code by AntiHybrid crafts several observable patterns, like hash algorithms or
data-flow reconstruction code, and thus could be detected by attackers. One possible solution
to this problem is to use existing diversity techniques to eliminate the common patterns [64].
We confirm that no specific patterns can be found in SpeedBump and BranchTrap because
we leverage CSmith [83] to randomly generate a new code snippet for each FUZZIFICATION
process.
Second, control-flow analysis can identify unused code in a given binary automatically
and thus automatically remove it (i.e., dead code elimination). However, this technique
cannot remove our FUZZIFICATION techniques, as all injected code is cross-referenced with
the original code. Third, data-flow analysis is able to identify the data dependency. We run
protected binaries inside the debugging tool, GDB, to inspect data dependencies between
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the injected code and the original code. We confirm that data dependencies always exist via
global variables, arguments, and the return values of injected functions. Finally, we consider
an adversary who is capable of conducting manual analysis for identifying the anti-fuzzing
code with the knowledge of our techniques. It is worth noting that we do not consider
strong adversaries who are capable of analyzing the application logic for vulnerability
discovery. Since FUZZIFICATION injected codes are supplemental to the original functions,
we conclude that the manual analysis can eventually identify and nullify our techniques
by evaluating the actual functionality of the code. However, since the injected code is
functionally similar to normal arithmetic operations and has control- and data-dependencies
on the original code, we believe that the manual analysis is time-consuming and error-prone,
and thus we can deter the time for revealing real bugs.
3.7 Discussion and Future Work
In this section, we discuss the limitations of FUZZIFICATION and suggest provisional
countermeasures against them.
Complementing attack mitigation system. The goal of anti-fuzzing is not to completely
hide all vulnerabilities from adversaries. Instead, it introduces an expensive cost on the
attackers’ side when they try to fuzz the program to find bugs, and thus developers are able
to detect bugs first and fix them in a timely manner. Therefore, we believe our anti-fuzzing
technique is an important complement to the current attack mitigation ecosystem. Existing
mitigation efforts either aim to avoid program bugs (e.g., through type-safe language [89, 90])
or aim to prevent successful exploits, assuming attackers will find bugs anyway (e.g., through
control-flow integrity [91, 92, 93]). As none of these defenses can achieve 100% protection,
our FUZZIFICATION techniques provide another level of defense that further enhances
program security. However, we emphasize that FUZZIFICATION alone cannot provide the
best security. Instead, we should keep working on all aspects of system security toward
a completely secure computer system, including but not limited to secure development
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process, effective bug finding, and efficient runtime defense.
Best-effort protection against adversarial analysis. Although we examined existing
generic analyses and believe they cannot completely disarm our FUZZIFICATION techniques,
the defensive methods only provide a best-effort protection. First, if attackers have almost
unlimited resources, such as when they launch APT (advanced persistent threat) attacks,
no defense mechanism can survive the powerful adversarial analysis. For example, with
extremely powerful binary-level control-flow analysis and data-flow analysis, attackers may
finally identify the injected branches by BranchTrap and thus reverse it for an unprotected
binary. However, it is hard to measure the amount of required resources to achieve this
goal, and meanwhile, developers can choose more complicated branch logic to mitigate
reversing. Second, we only examined currently existing techniques and cannot cover all
possible analyses. It is possible that attackers who know the details of our FUZZIFICATION
techniques propose a specific method to effectively bypass the protection, such as by utilizing
our implementation bugs. But in this case, the anti-fuzzing technique will also get updated
quickly to block the specific attack once we know the reversing technique. Therefore, we
believe the anti-fuzzing technique will get improved continuously along the back-and-forth
attack and defense progress.
Trade-off performance for security. FUZZIFICATION improves software security at
the cost of a slight overhead, including code size increase and execution slow down. A
similar trade-off has been shown in many defense mechanisms and affects the deployment
of defense mechanisms. For example, address space layout randomization (ASLR) has
been widely adopted by modern operating systems due to small overhead, while memory
safety solutions still have a long way to go to become practical. Fortunately, the protection
by FUZZIFICATION is quite flexible, where we provide various configuration options for
developers to decide the optimal trade-off between security and performance, and our tool
will automatically determine the maximum protection under the overhead budget.
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3.8 Conclusion
We propose a new attack mitigation system, called FUZZIFICATION, for developers to
prevent adversarial fuzzing. We develop three principled ways to hinder fuzzing: injecting
delays to slow fuzzed executions; inserting fabricated branches to confuse coverage feedback;
transforming data-flows to prevent taint analysis and utilizing complicated constraints to
cripple symbolic execution. We design robust anti-fuzzing primitives to hinder attackers
from bypassing FUZZIFICATION. Our evaluation shows that FUZZIFICATION can reduce
paths exploration by 70.3% and reduce bug discovery by 93.0% for real-world binaries, and
reduce bug discovery by 67.5% for LAVA-M dataset.
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CHAPTER 4
WINNIE: FUZZING WINDOWS APPLICATIONS WITH HARNESS
SYNTHESIS AND FAST CLONING
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4.1 Introduction
Fuzzing is an emerging software-testing technique for automatically validating program
functionalities and uncovering security vulnerabilities [1]. It randomly mutates program
inputs to generate a large corpus and feeds each input to the program. It monitors the
execution for abnormal behaviors, like crashing, hanging, or failing security checks [94].
Recent fuzzing efforts have found thousands of vulnerabilities in open-source projects [23,
24, 25, 26]. There are continuous efforts to make fuzzing faster [95, 19, 96] and smarter [28,
71, 18].
However, existing fuzzing techniques are mainly applied to Unix-like OSes, and few
of them work as well on Windows platforms. Unfortunately, Windows applications are
not free from bugs. Recent report shows that in the past 12 years, 70% of all security
vulnerabilities on Windows systems are memory safety issues [13]. In fact, due to the
dominance of Windows operating system, its applications remain the most lucrative targets
for malicious attackers [14, 15, 16, 17]. To bring popular fuzzing techniques to the Windows
platform, we investigate common applications and state-of-the-art fuzzers, and identify three
challenges of fuzzing applications on Windows: a predominance of graphical applications,
a closed-source ecosystem (e.g., third-party or legacy libraries), and the lack of fast cloning
machinery like fork on Unix-like OSes.
Windows applications heavily rely on GUIs (graphical user interfaces) to interact with
end-users, which poses a major obstacle to fuzzing. As shown in Figure 4.1, XnView [97]
requires the user to provide a file through the graphical dialog window. When the user
specifies the file path, the main executable parses the file, determines which library to
delegate to, and dynamically loads the necessary library to handle the input. Although some
efforts try to automate the user interaction [98], the execution speed is much slower than
ordinary fuzzing. For example, fuzzing GUI applications with AutoIt yields only around
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User interaction
Figure 4.1: Architecture of XnView on Windows. The program accepts the user input via the
GUI. The main executable parses the received path and dynamically loads the library to process the
input. A fuzzing harness bypasses the GUI to reach the functionality we wish to test.
than 1,000 executions per second. Speed is crucial for effective fuzzing, and this slow-down
renders fuzzing GUI application impractical.
The general way to overcome the troublesome GUI is to write a simple program, called
a harness, to assist with fuzzing. A harness replaces the GUI with a CLI (command-line
interface), prepares the execution context such as arguments and memory, and invokes
the target functions directly. In this way, we can test the target program without any user
interaction. For example, with a harness that receives the input path from the command
line and loads the decoder library, we can test XnView without worrying about the dialog
window. Recent work has even explored generating harnesses automatically for open-source
programs [100, 101].
Nevertheless, Windows fuzzing still relies largely on human effort to create effective
harnesses because most Windows programs are closed-source, commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) software [102, 103, 104, 105, 106]. Existing automatic harness synthesis methods
require to access the source code, and thus cannot handle closed-source programs easily [100,
101]. Without the source code, we have little knowledge of the program’s internals, like the
locations of interesting functions and their prototypes. Since manual analysis is error-prone
and unscalable to a large number of programs, we need a new method to generate fuzzing
harnesses directly from the binary.
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Finally, Windows lacks the fast cloning machinery (e.g., fork syscall) that greatly aids
fuzzing on Unix-like OSes. Linux fuzzers like AFL place a fork-server before the target
function, and subsequent executions reuse the pre-initialized state by forking. The fork-
server makes AFL run 1.5×–2× faster on Linux [107]. fork also improves the stability
of testing as each child process runs in its own address space, containing any side-effects,
like crashes or hangs. However, the Windows kernel does not expose a clear counterpart
for fork, nor any suitable alternatives. As a result, fuzzers have to re-execute the program
from the beginning for each new input, leading to a low execution speed. Although we can
write a harness to test the program in a big loop (aka., persistent mode [73]), testing many
inputs in one process harms stability. For example, each execution may gradually pollute
the global program state, eventually leading to divergence and incorrect behavior.
We propose an end-to-end system, WINNIE, to address the aforementioned challenges
and make fuzzing Windows programs more practical. WINNIE contains two components: a
harness generator that automatically synthesizes harnesses from the program binary alone,
and an efficient Windows fork-server. To construct plausible harnesses, our harness generator
combines both dynamic and static analysis. We run the target program against several inputs,
collect execution traces, and identify interesting functions and libraries that are suitable for
fuzzing. Then, our generator searches the execution traces to collect all function calls to
candidate libraries, and extracts them to form a harness skeleton. Finally, we try to identify
the relationships between different function calls and arguments to build a full harness.
Meanwhile, to implement an efficient fork-server for Windows systems, we identified and
analyzed undocumented Windows APIs that effectively support a Copy-on-Write fork
operation similar to the corresponding system call on Unix systems. We established the
requirements to use these APIs in a stable manner. The availability of fork eliminates
the need for existing, crude fuzzing techniques like persistent mode. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first practical counterpart of fork on Windows systems for fuzzing.
























Figure 4.2: Fuzzing overview. (1) The fuzzer maintains a queue of inputs. Each cycle, (2) it picks
one input from the queue and (3) modifies it to generate a new input. (4) It feeds the new input into
the fuzzed program and (5) records the code coverage. (6) If the execution triggers more coverage,
the new input is added back into the queue.
cutables, including Visual Studio, ACDSee, ultraISO and EndNote. Our harness generator
automatically synthesized candidate harnesses from execution traces, and 95% of them could
be fuzzed directly with only minor modifications (i.e., ≤ 10 LoC). Our improved fuzzer also
achieved 26.6× faster execution and discovered 3.6× more basic blocks than WinAFL, the
state-of-the-art fuzzer on Windows. By fuzzing these 59 harnesses, WINNIE successfully
found 61 bugs from 32 binaries. Out of the 59 harnesses, WinAFL only supported testing
29 binaries.
4.2 Background: Why Harness Generation?
Fuzzing is a popular automated technique for testing software. It generates program inputs
in a pseudo-random fashion and monitors program executions for abnormal behaviors (e.g.,
crashes, hangs or assertion violations). Since it was introduced, fuzzing has found tens of
thousands of bugs [108].
Most popular fuzzers employ greybox, feedback-guided fuzzing. Under this paradigm,
fuzzers treat programs like black boxes, but also rely on light-weight instrumentation
techniques to collect useful feedback (e.g., code coverage) from each run. The feedback is
used to measure how an input helps explore the program’s internal states. Thus, a fuzzer
can gauge how effective an input is at eliciting interesting behaviors from the program.
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Fuzzer AFL WinAFL HonggFuzz Peach WINNIE
Feedback ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✔
Forkserver ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔
Open-source ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔
Windows ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Table 4.1: Comparison between various Windows fuzzers and Linux AFL. We compare several
key features that we believe are essential to effective fuzzing. WINNIE aims to bring the ease and
efficiency of the Linux fuzzing experience to Windows systems.
Intuitively, since most bugs lie in the relatively complicated parts of code, the feedback
guides the fuzzer towards promising parts of the program. This gives greybox fuzzers a
decisive advantage over black-box fuzzers which blindly generate random inputs without
any runtime feedback.
AFL [2], a popular Linux fuzzer, exemplifies greybox fuzzing in practice. Figure 4.2
depicts AFL’s fuzzing process. The testing process is similar to a genetic algorithm. It
proceeds iteratively, mutating and testing new inputs each round. Inputs which elicit bugs
(i.e., crashes or hangs) or new code coverage from the program are selected for further
testing, while other uninteresting inputs are discarded. Across many cycles, AFL learns
to produce interesting inputs as it expands the code coverage map. Although simple, this
strategy is surprisingly successful: several recent advanced fuzzers [96, 95, 41] follow
the same high-level process. Overall, AFL-style, greybox fuzzing has proven extremely
successful on Linux systems.
Although most recent research efforts focus on improving fuzzing Linux applications [2,
95, 96, 3, 109, 41, 37], Windows programs are also vulnerable to memory safety issues.
Past researchers have uncovered many vulnerabilities by performing a manual audit [13].
In fact, Windows applications are especially interesting because they are commonly used
on end-user systems. These systems are prime targets for malicious attackers [16, 14].
Automatic Windows testing would pave a way for researchers to look for bugs in many
Windows programs while limiting manual code review. In turn, this would help secure the
Windows ecosystem.
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Unfortunately, no fuzzers can test Windows applications as effectively as AFL can test
Linux applications. Table 4.1 compares Linux AFL with popular Windows fuzzers. WinAFL
is a fork of AFL ported for Windows systems [110] and supports feedback-driven fuzzing.
HonggFuzz supports Windows, but only for fuzzing binaries in dumb mode, i.e., without
any coverage feedback [111]. Peach is another popular fuzzer with Windows support but
requires users to write specifications based on their knowledge of the fuzzed program [6].
Overall, although there are several rudimentary fuzzers for Windows systems, we find that
none offers fast and effortless testing in practice. In this thesis, we aim to address these
concerns and make Windows fuzzing truly practical. To do so, we must first examine what
the major obstacles are.
4.2.1 The GUI-Based, Closed-Source Software Ecosystem
Compared to Linux programs, Windows applications have two distinguishing features:
closed-source and GUI-based. First, many popular Windows applications are commercial
products and thus closed-source, like Microsoft Office, Adobe Reader, Photoshop, Win-
RAR, and Visual Studio. As these commercial applications contain proprietary intellectual
property, most of them are very unlikely to be open-sourced in the future. Second, Windows
software is predominantly GUI-based. Unlike on Linux which features a rich command-line
experience, essentially all of the aforementioned Windows programs are GUI applications.
Due to the closed nature of the ecosystem, vendors rarely have an incentive to provide a
command-line interface, as most end-users are most familiar with GUIs. In other words, the
only way to interact with most programs’ core functionality is through their GUI.
GUI applications pose a serious obstacle to effective fuzzing. First, GUI applications
typically require user interaction to get inputs, and cannot be tested automatically without
human intervention. Bypassing the GUI is nontrivial: it is slow to fully automate Windows
GUIs with scripting [99]; meanwhile avoiding the user interface altogether usually requires
a deep understanding of the application’s codebase, as programmers often intertwine the
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Program Harness GUI Ratio Program Harness GUI Ratio
HWP-jpeg 117 4075 34.8×↑ Tiled 28 720 25.7×↑
Gomplayer 15 1105 73.6×↑ ezPDF 184 4397 23.8×↑
ACDSee 16 510 31.8×↑ EndNote 30 1461 23.8×↑
Table 4.2: Execution times (ms) with and without GUI. GUI code dominates fuzzing execution
time (35× slower on average). Thus, fuzzing harnesses are crucial to effective Windows application
fuzzing. We measured GUI execution times by hooking GUI initialization code.
asynchronous GUI code with the input processing code [112]. Second, GUI applications are
slow to boot, wasting a lot of time on GUI initialization. Table 4.2 shows the startup times
of GUI applications compared to a fully-CLI counterpart. In our experiments, GUI code
often brought fuzzing speeds down from 10 or more executions per second to less than one.
Naturally, fuzzing a CLI version of the application is absolutely essential. WinAFL [110]
acknowledges this issue, and recommends users to create fuzzing harnesses.
4.2.2 Difficulty in Creating Windows Fuzzing Harnesses
It is a common practice to write fuzzing harnesses to test large, complicated software [100,
101]. In general, a harness is a relatively small program that prepares the program state for
testing deeply-embedded behaviors. Unlike the original program, we can flexibly customize
the harness to suit our fuzzing needs, like bypassing setup code or invoking interesting
functions directly. Hence, harnesses are a common tactic for enhancing fuzzing efficacy
in practice. For instance, Google OSS-Fuzz [113] built a myriad of harnesses on 263
open-source projects and found over 15,000 bugs [108].
Harnesses are especially useful when testing GUI-based Windows applications. First,
we can program the harness to accept input from a command-line interface, thus avoiding
user interaction. This effectively creates a dedicated CLI counterpart for the target program
which existing fuzzers can easily handle. Second, using a harness avoids wasting resources
on GUI initialization, focusing solely on the functionality at the heart of the program (e.g.,
file parsing) [102, 103, 105].
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Attributes Fudge FuzzGen Winnie
Binary ✗ ✗ ✔
Target OS Linux Linux/Android Windows
Control-flow analysis ✔ ✔ ✔
Data-flow analysis ✔ ✔ ✗
Input analysis Heuristic - Dynamic trace
Ptr / Struct analysis Heuristic Value-set analysis Heuristic
Table 4.3: Comparison of harness generation techniques. Most importantly, WINNIE supports
closed-source applications by approximating source-level analyses. Fine-grained data-flow tracing is
impractical without source code as it incurs a large overhead.
Unfortunately, Windows fuzzing faces a dilemma: due to the nature of the Windows
ecosystem, effective fuzzing harnesses are simultaneously indispensable yet very difficult
to create. In addition, due to the prevalence of closed-source applications, many existing
harness generation solutions are inadequate [100, 101]. As a result, harness creation often
requires in-depth reverse engineering by an expert, a serious human effort. In practice, this
is a serious hindrance to security researchers fuzzing Windows applications.
Fudge and FuzzGen. Fudge [100] and FuzzGen [101] aim to automatically generate
harnesses for open-source projects. Fudge generates harnesses by essentially extracting API
call sequences from existing source code that uses a library. Meanwhile, FuzzGen relies on
static analysis of source code to infer a library’s API, and uses this information to generate
harnesses. Table 4.3 highlights the differences between the existing solutions and WINNIE.
Most crucially, Fudge and FuzzGen generally target open-source projects belonging to the
Linux ecosystem, but WINNIE aims specifically to fuzz COTS, Windows software. Although
it may seem that Linux solutions should be portable to Windows systems, the GUI-based,
closed-source Windows software ecosystem brings new, unique challenges. As a result,
these tools cannot be used to generate harnesses for Windows applications.
Fudge, FuzzGen, and WINNIE all employ heuristics to infer API control-flow and data-
flow relationships. However, whereas Fudge and FuzzGen can rely on the availability of
source code, WINNIE cannot as a large amount of API information is irrevocably destroyed
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during the compilation process, especially under modern optimizing compilers. Thus,
although Fudge and FuzzGen’s analyses are more detailed and fine-grained, they are crucially
limited by their reliance on source code. This is the fundamental reason why these existing
solutions are not applicable to Windows fuzzing. Hence, a new set of strategies must be
developed to effectively generate fuzzing harnesses in the absence of source code.
4.3 Challenges and Solutions
WINNIE’s goal is to automate the process of creating fuzzing harnesses in the absence
of source code. From our experience, even manual harness creation is complicated and
error-prone. Thus, before exploring automatic harness generation, we will first discuss
several common difficulties researchers encounter when creating harnesses manually.
4.3.1 Complexity of Fuzzing Harnesses
Fuzzing harnesses must replicate all behaviors in the original program needed to reach the
code that we want to test. These behaviors could be complex and thus challenging to capture
in the harness. For instance, a harness may have to initialize and construct data structures
and objects, open file handles, and provide callback functions. We identified four major
steps to create a high-quality harness: 1 target discovery; 2 call-sequence recovery; 3
argument recovery; 4 control-flow and data-flow dependence reconstruction.
To illustrate these steps in action, we look into a typical fuzzing harness, shown in
Figure 4.3. XnView is an image organizer, viewer and editor application [97]. Although the
original program supports more than 500 file formats [114], our goal is to test the JPM parser,
implemented in the library ldf_jpm.dll. Figure 4.3 shows the corresponding harness. First,
the harness declares callback functions (lines 2-3), and initializes variables (lines 6 and 9).
Second, the harness imitates the decoding logic of the original program: it opens and reads
the input file (line 10), retrieves properties (lines 14-17), decodes the image (line 20), and
closes it (line 23). Lastly, the harness declares the required variables (line 9) and uses them
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1 // 1) Declare structures and callbacks
2 int callback1(void* a1, int a2) { ... }
3 int callback2(void* a1) { ... }
4
5 // 2) Prepare file handle
6 FILE *fp = fopen("filename", "rb");
7
8 // 3) Initialize objects, internally invoking ReadFile()
9 int *f0_a0 = (int*) calloc(4096, sizeof(int));
10 int f0_ret = JPM_Document_Start(f0_a0, &callback1, &fp);
11 if (f0_ret){ exit(0); }
12
13 // 4) Get property of the image
14 int f1_a2 = 0, int f4_a2 = 0;
15 JPM_Document_Get_Page_Property((void *)f0_a0[0], 0xA, &f1_a2);
16 ...
17 JPM_Document_Get_Page_Property((void *)f0_a0[0], 0xD, &f4_a2);
18
19 // 5) Decode the image
20 JPM_Document_Decompress_Page((void *)f0_a0[0], &callback2);
21
22 // 6) Finish the harness
23 JPM_Document_End((void *)f0_a0[0]);
Figure 4.3: An example harness, synthesized by our harness generator. It tests the JPM parser
inside the ldf_jpm.dll library of the application XnView. The majority of the harness was correct
and usable out of the box. We describe the steps taken to create this harness in §4.3.1 and in more
detail in §4.4. Low level details are omitted for brevity.
appropriately (lines 15, 17, 20 and 23). Conditional control flow based on return values is
also considered to make the program exit gracefully upon failures (line 11).
1 Target discovery. The first step of fuzzing is to identify promising targets that handle
user inputs. This process can be time-consuming as, depending on the program, the input
may be specified in a variety of ways, such as by filename, by file descriptor, or by file
contents (whole or partial). In this example, the researcher should identify that the API
JPM_Document_Start from ldf_jpm.dll library is responsible for accepting the user input
through a pointer of an opened file descriptor (line 10).
2 Call-sequence recovery. The harness must reproduce the correct order of all function
calls relevant to the target library. In this example, there are total 10 API calls to be
reconstructed in the full harness. Note that static analysis alone is not enough to discover all
callsites. Due to the prevalence of indirect calls and jump tables, researchers must also use
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dynamic analysis to get the concrete values of the call targets.
3 Argument recovery. The harness must also pass valid arguments to each function call.
Reconstructing these arguments is challenging: the argument could be a pointer to a callback
function (like &callback1 at line 10), a pointer to an integer (like &f1_a2 at line 15), a
constant (like 0xa at line 15), or many other types. When manually constructing a harness,
the researcher must examine every argument for each API call, relying on their expertise to
determine what the function expects.
4 Control-flow and data-flow dependence. It is oftentimes insufficient to simply produce
a list of function calls in the right order. Moreover, libraries define implicit semantic
relationships among APIs. These relationships manifest in control-flow dependencies
and data-flow dependencies. For example, a conditional branch between API calls may be
required for the harness to work, like the if-statement at line 11 of the example. Alternatively,
one API may return or update a pointer which is used by a later API call. Unless these
relationships are respected, the resulting harness will be incorrect, yielding false positives
and spurious crashes. For example, the above code updates array f0_a0 at line 10, and
uses the first element in lines 15, 17, 20, and 23. In the absence of source code, this step
is extremely challenging, and even the most advanced harness generator cannot guarantee
correctness. Human intuition and experience can supplement auto-analysis when reverse-
engineering.
4.3.2 Limitations of Existing Solutions
As Windows does not provide fast process cloning machinery (e.g., Linux’s fork), fuzzers
usually start each execution from the very beginning. Considering the long start-up time of
Windows applications (see Table 4.2), each re-execution wastes a lot of time to reinitialize
the program. Existing solutions (e.g., WinAFL) resort to a technique known as persistent
mode to overcome the re-execution overhead [73]. In persistent mode, the fuzzer repeatedly



























































































































































































































































program each iteration. To realize the most performance gains, one generally aims to test as
many inputs as possible per new process.
While persistent mode partially addresses the performance issues of Windows fuzzing,
its efficacy is limited by its strict requirements on the loop body. Specifically, persistent
mode expects harnesses to behave like pure functions, meaning that harnesses avoid any
side-effects, such as leaking memory or modifying global variables. Otherwise, each
execution would start from a different program state. Since the harness is repeatedly looped
for thousands of iterations, even the smallest side-effects will gradually accumulate over
time, finally leading to problems like memory leaks, unreproducible crashes and hangs, and
unreliable coverage. For example, a program that leaks 1MB of memory per iteration will
reach WinAFL’s default memory limit and be terminated. We experienced such errors very
often in practice, and discuss more details later in §4.7.1.
Many side-effect errors from persistent mode are difficult to debug or difficult to cir-
cumvent. A common issue is that persistent mode cannot continue if the target function
does not return to the caller. For example, a program can implement error handling by
simply terminating the program. Because most inputs generated during fuzzing are invalid
(albeit benign), this still demands constant re-execution, severely degrading performance.
Another common problem is that a program will open the input file in exclusive mode (i.e.,
other processes cannot open the same file) without closing it. This prevents the fuzzer from
updating the input file in the next iteration, breaking persistent mode. Problems like these
limit the applicability and scalability of persistent mode fuzzers.
4.3.3 Our Solutions
We propose WINNIE, an end-to-end system that addresses aforementioned obstacles to
effectively and efficiently fuzz Windows applications. WINNIE contains two components,
a harness generator that synthesizes harnesses for closed-source Windows programs with
minimal manual effort (§4.4), and a fuzzer that can handle uncooperative target applications
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with our efficient fork implementation (Figure 4.7). Figure 4.4 shows an overview of our
system. Given the program binary and sample inputs, our tracer runs the program and
meanwhile, collects dynamic information about the target application, including API calls,
arguments and memory contents. From the trace, we identify interesting fuzzing targets that
handle user input, including functions in external libraries and locations inside the main
binary. For each fuzzing target, our harness generator analyzes the traces and reconstructs
related API sequences as a working harness. We test the generated harnesses to confirm
their robustness and effectiveness, and then launch fuzzing instances with our fork-server
to find bugs. In the following sections, we will use the harness shown in Figure 4.3 as an
example to explain the design of each component of WINNIE.
4.4 Harness Generation
To generate the harness, WINNIE followed the four steps previously outlined in §4.3.1.
Consider XnView as an example:
1 For target discovery (§4.4.1), we trace XnView while opening several JPM files, and then
search the traces for input-related APIs, such as OpenFile and ReadFile.
2 For call-sequence recovery (§4.4.2), we search the traces for function calls related to the
fuzzing target. In the example, we find all the function calls related to the chosen library
(lines 10, 15, 17, 20 and 23). We put the call-sequence into the harness, forming a harness
skeleton. The skeleton is now more-or-less a simple series of API calls, which we then flesh
out further.
3 For argument recovery (§4.4.3), we analyze the traces to deduce the prototype for each
function in the call sequence. The traces contain verbose information about APIs between
the main binary and libraries, like arguments and return values.
4 Finally, we establish the relationships (§4.4.4) among the various calls and variables
presented in the harness skeleton and emit the final code after briefly testing (§4.4.5) the
candidate harness. WINNIE also points out complicated logic potentially missed by our
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Class Type What to record
1 Module string name, path, module
2 Call/Jump inter-module thread id, caller, callee, symbols, args
intra-module same as above, only for main .exe
3 Return inter-module thread id, callee, caller, retval
intra-module same as above, only for main .exe
4 Arg/RetVal constants concrete value
pointers address and referenced data (recursively)
Table 4.4: Dynamic information collected by the tracer. We record detailed information about
every inter-module call. We also record the same information for intra-module calls within the main
binary. If the argument or return value is a pointer, we recursively dump memory around the pointed
location. We then use this information to construct fuzzing harnesses (§4.4).
tracer (such as the callback function at line 20) as areas for further improvement.
4.4.1 Fuzzing Target Identification
In this step, WINNIE evaluates whether the program can be fuzzed and tries to identify
promising target functions. We begin by performing dynamic analysis on the target program
as it processes several chosen inputs. Table 4.4 shows a detailed list of items that the
tracer captures during each execution. 1 We record the name and the base address of all
loaded modules. 2 For each call and jump that transfers control flow between modules, our
tracer records the current thread ID, the caller and callee addresses, symbols (if available),
and arguments. Without function prototype information, we conservatively treat all CPU
registers and upper stack slots as potential arguments. 3 We record return values when
encountering a return instruction. 4 If any of values fall into accessible memory, we
conservatively treat it as a pointer and dump the referenced memory for further analysis.
To capture multi-level pointer relationships (e.g., double or triple pointers), we repeat this
process recursively. For pointers, we also recognize common string encodings (e.g., C
strings) and record them appropriately.
Using our captured traces, we look for functions which are promising fuzzing targets. It
is commonly believed that good fuzzing targets have two key features [115, 73]: the library
accepts the user-provided file path as the input, and it opens the file, parses the content and
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closes the file. We use these two features to find candidate libraries for fuzzing. Specifically,
for each function call, we check whether one of its arguments points to a file path, like
C:\my_img.jpm. To detect user-provided paths, our harness generator accepts filenames
as input. Next, we identify callers of well-known file-related APIs such as OpenFile and
ReadFile. If a library has functions accepting file paths, or invokes file-related APIs, we
consider it is an input-parsing library and treat it as a fuzzing candidate.
WINNIE also identifies library functions that do not open or read the file themselves,
but instead accept a file descriptor or an in-memory buffer as input. To identify functions
accepting input from memory, our tracer dissects pointers passed to calls and checks if
the referenced memory contains any content from the input file. We also verify that the
appropriate file-read APIs were called. To find functions taking file descriptors as inputs,
we inspect all invocations of file-open APIs and track the opened file descriptors. Then, we
check whether the library invokes file-related APIs on those file descriptors.
Our harness generator focuses primarily on the external interfaces a library exposes. On
the other hand, we do not record control flow within the same module as these represent
libraries’ internal logic. Because invoking the API through those interfaces models the same
behavior as the original program, inter-module traces are sufficient for building an accurate
harness. However, we treat the main executable as a special case and record all control-flow
information within it. This is because the main executable is responsible for calling out to
external libraries. Thus, we also search the intra-module call-graph of the main executable
for suitable fuzzing targets.
WINNIE then expands its search to within the main binary by analyzing its call-graph.
Specifically, WINNIE begins at the lowest common ancestor (LCA) of I/O functions and the
parsing library APIs we previously identified. In a directed acyclic graph, the LCA of two
nodes is the deepest one that can reach both. In our case, we search for the lowest node in
the main binary’s callgraph that satisfies two criteria. First, it should be before the file-read


















Figure 4.5: A simplified call-graph of the ACDSee program. WINNIE analyzes the call-graph
for fuzzing possible targets, focusing on inter-module calls and I/O functions. We look for functions
that can reach both I/O functions and also the interesting ones we wish to fuzz. “†” indicates such
functions, known as LCA candidates (§4.4.1).
opened the input file, we still can modify it so the program uses the new content. Second,
the LCA should reach locations that invoke parsing functions. Figure 4.5 shows an example
callgraph from the program ACDSee. The function at address 0x5cce80 is the LCA as it
reaches two file-related APIs (i.e., OpenFile and ReadFile) and also invokes the parsing
functionality in ide_acdstd.apl. We also consider the LCA’s ancestors (e.g., main()) as
fallback candidates, if the immediate LCA does not yield a working harness. In cases where
a working LCA is found, it often is sufficient for making an effective harness.
Our tool can also optionally use differential analysis to refine the set of candidate fuzzing
targets. Given two sets of inputs, one triggering the target functionality and another not
triggering, WINNIE will compare the two execution traces and locate the library functions
that are specific to the target functionality. We discard the other functions which are present
in both sets of traces. This feature helps deal with multi-threaded applications where only
one thread performs operations related to the input file. In any case, differential analysis is
optional; it only serves as an additional criteria to improve harness generation.
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4.4.2 Call-sequence Recovery
Now that we have identified a candidate fuzzing target, our goal in this step is to reproduce
a series of API calls which will correctly reach and trigger the functionality we wish to
fuzz. We call such an API sequence a harness skeleton. We search the traces for function
calls related to that library and copy them to the harness skeleton (lines 10, 15, 17, 20, 23
in Figure 4.3). We also reconstruct the functions’ prototypes (e.g., argument count and
types) with hybrid analysis: we combine the static analysis provided by IDA Pro [116]
or Ghidra [117] with concrete information retrieved from the dynamic execution traces.
Namely, we apply pointer types to arguments that were valid addresses in the traces, as the
static analysis can misidentify pointer arguments as integers. Lastly, we attach auxiliary
code that is required to make the harness work, like a main function, forward function
declarations, and helper code to open or read files (line 6).
Special care must be taken to handle applications which use multiple threads. In that
case, we will only consider the threads that invoke file-related APIs. This is to avoid adding
irrelevant calls that harm the correctness of the harness. We encountered several programs
that exhibit this behavior, such as GomPlayer, which had hundreds of irrelevant function
calls in the execution trace. When the program creates multiple threads within the same
library, the trace records an interleaving of many threads’ function calls combined. However,
since we recorded the thread IDs in our previous step, we can untangle the threads to focus
on them individually. With the per-thread analysis, we can narrow the number of calls down
to just seven.
4.4.3 Argument Recovery
In this step, we reconstruct the arguments that should be passed to each API call in the
call sequence recovered in the previous step. WINNIE attempts to symbolize the raw
argument values recorded in the traces into variables and constants. First, we identify pointer
arguments. We do so empirically through differential analysis of the trace data. Specifically,
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the tracer runs the program with the same input twice, both times with address space layout
randomization (ASLR) enabled [118]. Because ASLR randomizes memory addresses across
different runs, two pointers passed to the same call site will have different, pseudo-random
values that are accessible addresses both times. If this is the case, we can infer that the
argument is a pointer. For pointer arguments, we use the concrete memory contents from
the trace, dissecting multiple levels of pointers of necessary. Otherwise, we simply consider
the value of the argument itself.
Next, we determine whether the argument is static or variable. Values which vary from
execution to execution are variable, and we define names for variables and replace their
uses with new names. Values which remain constant between runs are static, and we simply
pass them as the constant value seen in the trace (like 0xA and 0xD in Figure 4.3).
4.4.4 Control-Flow and Data-Flow Reconstruction
WINNIE analyzes the program to reflect control-flow and data-flow dependencies in the
harness. Control-flow dependencies represent how the various API calls are logically related
(e.g., the if-statement on line 11 in Figure 4.3). To find control-flow dependencies, we apply
static analysis. Specifically, WINNIE analyzes the control-flow between two API calls for
paths from the return value of the invoked function to a termination condition (e.g., return or
exit()). If such a path is found, WINNIE duplicates the decompiled control-flow code (e.g.,
if-statements). The current version of WINNIE avoids analyzing complex flows involving
multiple assignments or variable operands in the conditional statement; we leave such cases
to a human expert. This is important for accurate harness generation: neglecting control-flow
dependencies causes incorrect behavior. For example, consider a harness that fails to reflect
an early exit error handling condition in the original program. The program under normal
execution would terminate immediately, but the harness would proceed onwards to some
unpredictable program state. These kinds of mistakes lead to unreproducible crashes (i.e.,
false positives).
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Data-flow dependencies represent the relationships among function arguments and return
values. To find data-flow dependencies, WINNIE tries to connect multiple uses of the same
variable between multiple call sites (e.g., f0_a0 in Figure 4.3). We consider the following
possible cases:
• Simple flows from return values. Return values of past function calls are commonly
reused as arguments for later calls. We detect these cases by checking if an argument
always has the same value as a past return value. We only do this for whose values
exceed a certain threshold. If we connected any frequently observed values (e.g.,
connect return value 0 as the next argument), we may generate incorrect harnesses;
this resolves many common cases where functions return object pointers.
• Points-to relationships. Some arguments are retrieved from memory using pointers
returned by previous code. For instance, an API may return a pointer, whose pointed
contents are used as an argument in a later API call. In the example harness in
Figure 4.3, line 23 uses an argument f0_a0 that is loaded from memory, initialized
by the API JPM_Document_Start. When we detect these points-to relationships in the
trace, we reflect them in the harness as pointer dereferences (i.e., *p). WINNIE also
supports multi-level points-to relationships (e.g., double and triple pointers), thanks to
the tracer’s recursive memory dumping.
• Aliasing. WINNIE defines a variable if it observes one or more repeated usages. In
other words, if the same non-constant value is used twice as an argument, then the
two uses are considered aliases forming a single variable.
4.4.5 Harness Validation and Finalization
Although it covers most common cases, WINNIE’s harness generator is not foolproof.
WINNIE points out parts of the harness that is unsure about and provides suggestions to help
users further improve it. 1 We report distant API calls where the second API’s call site is
far from the first. In such cases, our API-based tracer might have missed some logic between
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two API calls. 2 We highlight code pointer arguments to users, which could represent
callback function pointers or virtual method tables. 3 We provide information about file
operations as they are generally important during harness construction.
Once a fuzzing harness has been generated, we perform a few preliminary tests to
evaluate its effectiveness. First, we check the harness’s stability. We run the harness against
several normal inputs; if the harness crashes, we immediately discard it. Second, we evaluate
the harness’s ability to explore program states. Specifically, we fuzz the harness for a short
period and check whether the code coverage increases over time. We discard harnesses that
fail to discover new coverage. Lastly, we test the execution speed of the harness. Of all
stable, effective harnesses, we present the fastest ones to the user.
WINNIE’s goal is to generate harnesses automatically. However, the general problem of
extracting program behaviors from runtime traces without source code is very challenging
so there will always be cases it cannot cover. Thus, we aim to handle most common cases to
maximize WINNIE’s ability to save the human researcher’s time. We observe that in practice
it produces good approximations of valid harnesses, and most of them can be fuzzed with
only minor modifications as shown in Table 4.7. We discuss our system’s limitations and
weaknesses in §4.7.3 and §4.8.
4.5 Fast Process Cloning on Windows
Fork indeed exists on Windows systems [119], but existing work fails to provide a stable im-
plementation. To support efficient fuzzing of Windows applications, we reverse-engineered
various internal Windows APIs and services and identified a key source of instability. After
overcoming these challenges, we were able to implement a practical and robust fork-server
for Windows fuzzing. Specifically, our implementation of the Windows fork corrects the
problems related to the CSRSS, which is a user-mode process that controls the underlying
layer of the Windows environment [120]. If a process is not connected to the CSRSS, it will
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Figure 4.6: Overview of fork() on Windows. We analyzed various Windows APIs and services to
achieve a CoW fork() functionality suitable for fuzzing. Note that fixing up the CSRSS is essential
for fuzzing COTS Windows applications: if the CSRSS is not re-initialized, the child process will
crash when accessing Win32 APIs.
uses the Win32 API. Our fork correctly informs the CSRSS of newly-created child processes,
as shown in Figure 4.6. Connecting to the CSRSS is not trivial for forked processes: for the
call to succeed, we must manually de-initialize several undocumented variables before the
child process connects.
To the best of our knowledge, our fork implementation is the only one that can sup-
port fuzzing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Windows applications. Table 4.5 shows a
comparison of process creation techniques on Windows and Linux. CreateProcess is the
standard Windows API for creating new processes with a default program state, used by
WinAFL. New processes must re-execute everything from the beginning, wasting a lot of
time on GUI initialization code, shown in Table 4.2. Persistent mode [73] aims to mitigate
the re-execution overhead, but is impractical due to the numerous problems outlined in
§4.3.2. Thus, our goal is to avoid re-executions altogether by introducing a fork-style API.
Meanwhile, Cygwin’s fork implementation is not designed for COTS Windows applica-
tions. It works by manually copying the program state after calling CreateProcess. It also
suffers from problems related to address space layout randomization [121]. The Windows
Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is designed for running Linux ELF binaries on Windows.
67
Re-execute Forkserver
Fork() CreateProcess WINNIE Cygwin WSL(v1) WSL(v2) Linux
Supports PE files? ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗
Copy-on-Write? ✗ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔
Speed (exec/sec) 91.9 310.9 72.8 442.8 405.1 4907.5
Table 4.5: Comparison of fork() implementations. Cygwin is not CoW, and WSL does not
support Windows PE binaries. WINNIE’s new fork API is therefore the most suitable for Windows
fuzzing.
Thus, we cannot use it for testing Windows PE binaries, even if it is faster [122]. Our
fork implementation achieves a speed comparable to the WSL fork, and most importantly,
supports Windows PE applications.
Verifying the Fork Implementation. We ran several test programs under our fork-server
to verify its correctness. First, verified that each child process receives a correct copy
of the global program state. We checked various the values of global variables in test
programs before and after forking a new process. For example, we incremented a global
counter in the parent process after each fork and verified that the child process received
the old value. Second, to verify that the fork implementation is CoW (copy-on-write), we
initialized large amounts of memory in the parent process before forking. Because the
memory footprint of the parent process did not affect the time taken by fork, we concluded
that our implementation is indeed CoW.
We also briefly measured the speed of fork with WinAFL’s built-in test program as
shown in Table 4.5. On an Intel i7 CPU, we were able to call our fork 310.9 times/sec per
core with a simple program, which is 4.2× faster than Cygwin’s No-CoW fork and ∼1.3×
slower than the WSL fork. Since we are not using the same fork mechanism as the one
provided by the Linux kernel but instead mimicking its CoW behavior using the Windows
API, the execution speed is nowhere as fast (e.g., >5,000 execs/sec). Even if Windows
implementation of fork is slower than Linux’s, the time regained from avoiding costly
re-executions easily makes up for the overhead of fork. Moreover, the process creation
machinery on Windows is slow in general: in our experiments, ordinary CreateProcess
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Category Component Lines of code
Harness generator Dynamic tracer 1.6K LoC of C++
Synthesizer 2.0K LoC of Python
Fuzzer Fuzzer 3.0K LoC of C++
Fork library 0.5K LoC of C++
Table 4.6: WINNIE components and code size
calls (as used by WinAFL) only reach speeds of less than 100 execs/sec. Overall, we believe
that the reliability and quality of our Windows fork-server is comparable to ones used for
fuzzing on Unix systems.
Idiosyncrasies of Windows Fork. Our fork implementation has a few nuances due to
the design of the Windows operating system. First, if multiple threads exist in the parent
process, only the thread calling fork is cloned. This could lead to deadlocks or hangs in
multi-threaded applications. Linux’s fork has the same issue. To sidestep this problem,
we target deeply-nested functions that behave in a thread-safe fashion. For example, in the
program UltraISO, we bypassed the GUI and fuzzed the target function directly, shown in
Table 4.7. Second, handle objects, the Windows equivalent of Unix file descriptors, are not
inherited by the child process by default. To address this issue, we enumerate all relevant
handles and manually mark them inheritable. Third, because the data structures involved in
fork-related APIs differ from version to version of Windows, it is impractical to support all
possible installations of Windows. Nevertheless, our fork-server supports all recent builds
of Windows 10. Since Windows is very backwards-compatible, we do not see this as a
significant limitation of our implementation.
4.6 Implementation
We prototyped WINNIE with 7.1K lines of code (shown in Table 4.6). WINNIE supports
both 32- and 64-bit Windows PE binaries. We built our fuzzer on top of WinAFL and




Figure 4.7 shows an overview of our fuzzer. We inject a fuzzing agent agent.dll into the tar-
get program, which cooperates with the fuzzer using a pipe for bidirectional communication.
This architecture helps assuage the most uncooperative of fuzzing targets.
The fuzzing agent is injected as soon as the program loads, before any application code
has begun executing. Once injected, the agent first hooks the function specified by the
harness and promptly returns control to the target application. Then, the target application
resumes and initializes itself. The application halts once it reaches the hooks, and the fuzzing
agent spins up the fork-server. Since we spin up the fork-server only at some point deep
within the program, initialization code only runs once, massively improving performance.
Our fuzzer works as follows: 1 The fuzzing agent, which contains the fork server, is
injected into the target application. The injected agent 2 installs function hooks on the
entry point and the target function, and 3 instruments all basic blocks so it can collect code
coverage. 4 Then, the fuzzer creates forked processes. Using the pipe between the fuzzer
and target processes, 5 the agent reports program’s status and 6 the fuzzer handles coverage
and crash events.
4.6.2 Reliable Instrumentation
Collecting code coverage from closed-source applications is challenging, specially for
Windows applications. WinAFL uses two methods to collect code coverage: one using
dynamic binary instrumentation using DynamoRIO [110], and another using hardware
features through Intel PT (IPT) [124]. Unfortunately, DynamoRIO and IPT are prone to
crashes and hangs. In our evaluation, WinAFL was only able to run 26 of 59 targets.
To address this issue, we discard dynamic binary instrumentation in favor of fullspeed
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Figure 4.7: Overview of WINNIE’s fuzzer. We inject a fuzzing agent into the target. The injected
agent spawns the fork-server, instruments basic blocks, and hooks several functions. This improves
performance (§4.6.1) and sidesteps various instrumentation issues (§4.6.2).
except when the fuzzer discovers a new basic block. Based on boolean basic block coverage,
fullspeed fuzzing only considers there to be new coverage when a new basic block is
visited. To implement this, we patch all basic blocks of the tested program with an int 3
instruction. Then, we fuzz the patched program and wait for the execution to reach a new
block. When reached, the first byte of the new block is then restored so that it will no
longer generate exceptions in the future. Since encountering new basic blocks is rare during
fuzzing, fullspeed fuzzing has negligible overhead and can run the target application at
essentially native speed. Breakpoints need only be installed once thanks to the fork-server:
child processes inherit the same set of breakpoints as the parent. We noticed that this is
an important optimization as we observe Windows applications easily contain a massive
number of basic blocks (e.g., >100K).
4.7 Evaluation
We evaluated WINNIE on real-world programs to answer the following questions:
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• Applicability of WINNIE. Can WINNIE test a large variety of Windows applications?
(§4.7.1)
• Efficiency of fork. How efficient is fork on versus other modes of fuzzing like
persistent mode? (§4.7.2)
• Accuracy of harness generation. How effectively can WINNIE create fuzzing har-
nesses from binaries? (§4.7.3)
• Finding new bugs. Can WINNIE discover new program states and bugs from real
world applications? (§4.7.4)
Evaluation Setup. Our evaluation mainly compares WINNIE with WinAFL. Other
Windows fuzzers either do not support feedback-driven fuzzing (e.g., Peach [6]), or cannot
directly fuzz Windows binaries (e.g., HonggFuzz [111]). We configured WinAFL to use
basic-block coverage as feedback and used persistent-mode to maximize performance. Our
evaluation of WinAFL considers two modes, the DynamoRIO mode (WinAFL-DR) where
WinAFL relies on dynamic binary instrumentation, and the PT mode where WinAFL uses
the Intel PT hardware feature to collect code coverage. We enlarged the Intel PT ring buffer
sizes from 128 kilobytes to 512 kilobytes to mitigate data-loss issues [93]. We performed
the evaluation on an Intel Xeon E5-2670 v3 (24 cores at 2.30GHz) and 256 GB RAM. All
the evaluations were run on Windows 10, except WinAFL-DR, which was run on Windows
7 as it did not run properly under Windows 10.
Target Program Selection. We generated 59 valid fuzzing harnesses with WINNIE. We ran
all 59 programs test the applicability of WINNIE (§4.7.1). For the other evaluations (§4.7.2
to §4.7.4), we randomly chose 15 GUI or CLI applications among the 59 generated harnesses
due to limited hardware resources (i.e., 15 apps × 24 hrs × 5 trials = 5,400 CPU hrs). We
aimed to show that WINNIE can fuzz complicated GUI applications and that WINNIE also
outperforms existing solutions on CLI programs. Thus, we chose a mixture of both types of
binaries from a variety of real-world applications. For this evaluation, we mainly focused on














Figure 4.8: Applicability of WINNIE and WinAFL. Among 59 executables, WinAFL-IPT and
WinAFL-DR failed to run 33 and 30 respectively, whereas WINNIE was able to test all 59 executables.
(i.e., error-prone) and handle untrusted inputs.
4.7.1 Applicability of WINNIE
Figure 4.8 shows that WINNIE supports running a wider variety of Windows applications
than WinAFL. Specifically, WINNIE successfully generates working harnesses for all pro-
grams and is able to test them efficiently. WinAFL-IPT failed to run 33 of out 59 harnesses
(55.9%) while WinAFL-DR failed to run 30 (50.8%). Execution timeouts during the dry-
runs dominate all failed cases of WinAFL (18 for WinAFL-IPT and 19 for WinAFL-DR).
Specifically, before the fuzzing fully begins, WinAFL launches a few dry-runs to verify
that the fuzzing setup is valid (e.g., harness quality). If the program times out during the
dry-run, WinAFL will not be able to continue the testing. The second main failure mode
was crashing during the dry-run. This contributed seven failures for WinAFL-IPT and eight
for WinAFL-DR. We provide several case studies to understand why WinAFL fails to test
these programs:
Unexpected Change in Global State. 1 mspdbcmf.exe is a PDB (debug symbol file)
conversion tool, and WinAFL failed with a timeout error. When the fuzzer executes the
same function iteratively, the program falls into a termination condition, due to a corrupted
global variable. In particular, the program assigns a non-zero value to the global variable
(g_szPdbMini) in the first execution, and the changed value makes the application terminate
during the second execution. In other words, the root cause was that the target function
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was not idempotent. Unfortunately, WinAFL misclassifies this unexpected termination
as a timeout, and thus the fuzzer quits after the dry-run. 2 ML.exe (Macro assembler
and Linker) is an assembler program in Visual Studio that crashes when fuzzing begins.
Similar to the aforementioned timeout issue, a crash happens at the second execution of
the main function. In the first execution, the target program checks the global flag (i.e.,
fHasAssembled) to determine whether the assembly is done and then initializes necessary
heap variables. Once the program finishes the first time, it changes the global flag to true.
In the second execution, the program’s control flow diverges because the fHasAssembled
flag is true. This ultimately leads to a crash when it tries to access the uninitialized heap
variable.
IPT Driver Issues. The dynamic binary instrumentation adopted by WinAFL-IPT had
unknown issues and sometimes prevented WinAFL from collecting code coverage. For
example, for the program KGB archiver, we observed that the fuzzer could not receive any
coverage due to a Intel-PT driver error.
4.7.2 Benefits of Fork
We tested whether fork makes fuzzing more efficient. To do so, we ran the selected
programs under our fuzzer in fork mode, while we set WinAFL to create a new process
for each execution (re-execution mode). Both of these configurations can run the target
program reliably. As shown in Table 4.8, fork improves fuzzing performance: compared to
re-execution mode, WINNIE achieved 31.3× faster execution speeds and discovered 4.0×
more basic blocks. In particular, GomPlayer and EndNote recorded 64.7× and 87.3× faster
executions and revealed 7.4× and 10.2× more basic blocks respectively.
We also evaluated whether fork makes fuzzing more stable. We configured WinAFL
to use persistent mode, which runs a specific target function in a loop. Then, we tracked
the system’s memory and resource usage over time while fuzzing. Almost immediately,
we observed memory leaks in the persistent mode harnesses for HWP-jpeg, HWP-tiff, and
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Program Target Size API Calls LoC Fixed (LoC) (%)
ACDSee IDE_ACDStd.apl 3007K 19 506 CB (38), ST (174) 34.3
HWP-jpeg HncJpeg10.dll 220K 3 92 CB (7), ST (8) 16.3
ezPDF Pdf2Office.dll 3221K 4 112 CB (2), ST (8) 8.9
HWP-tiff HncTiff10.dll 630K 3 82 CB (7) 8.5
UltraIso UltraISO.exe 5250K 1 57 CB (2) 3.5
XnView ldf_jpm.dll 692K 10 199 CB (4), pointer (2) 3.0
Gomplayer avformat-gp.dll 4091K 7 116 pointer (2) 1.7
file magic1.dll 147K 3 96 0 0.0
EndNote PC4DbLib 2738K 1 55 0 0.0
7z 7z.exe 1114K 1 55 0 0.0
makecab makecab.exe 50K 1 55 0 0.0
Tiled tmxviewer.exe 113K 1 55 0 0.0
mspdbcmf mspdbcmf.exe 1149K 1 55 0 0.0
pdbcopy pdbcopy.exe 726K 1 55 0 0.0
ml ml.exe 476K 1 55 0 0.0
CB: Callback function, ST: Custom struct
Table 4.7: Harnesses generated by WINNIE. The majority of the harnesses worked out of the box
with few modifications. Some required fixes for callback and struct arguments, which we discuss
below.
Program Without Fork ForkLeak Hang† Speed Cov. Speed Coverage
7z 5.2 1430 49.3 (9.5×↑) 2117 (1.5×↑)
makecab ✗ 14.8 576 49.4 (3.3×↑) 1020 (1.8×↑)
GomPlayer ✗ 0.4 201 25.9 (64.7×↑) 1496 (7.4×↑)
Hwp-jpeg ✗ 4.2 1045 25.9 (6.2×↑) 1847 (1.8×↑)
Hwp-tiff ✗ ✗ 0.3 1340 26.2 (87.3×↑) 2301 (1.7×↑)
EndNote 5.3 68 89.5 (16.9×↑) 693 (10.2×↑)
Total 3/6 2/6 (31.3×↑) (4.0×↑)
Table 4.8: Evaluation of fork(). We ran six applications that both WinAFL and WINNIE could fuzz
for 24 hours. We compared their speed and checked for memory and handle (i.e., file descriptor)
leaks. fork not only improves the performance, but also mitigates resource leaks. Hang† means an





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































makecab. The HWP-jpeg and HWP-tiff harnesses also leaked file handles, which would
lead to system handle exhaustion if the fuzzer runs for a long time. These types of leaks tend
to cause fuzzing to unpredictably fail after long periods of fuzzing, creating a big headache
for the human researcher. We explain this in further detail in §4.3.2. fork prevented the
memory leaks and file handle leaks, improving stability. We further discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of persistent mode in §4.8.
4.7.3 Efficacy of Harness Generation
In this section, we evaluate how well WINNIE helps users create effective fuzzing harnesses.
To do so, we diffed the initial and final harness code in our evaluation. We analyzed the fixes
required to make the harnesses work, and present the findings in Table 4.7 and Table 4.9.
As shown, the majority of the harnesses worked with no modifications. On average, the
synthesized harnesses had 82.7 LoCs, relied on 3.2 heuristics, and required only 3.4% of the
code to be modified. Based on our findings, we discuss the various strengths and weaknesses
of the harness generator below.
Strengths of the Harness Generator. The execution tracer provides helpful information
about the target program, such as promising fuzzing targets (i.e., Table 4.9: Target identi-
fication). This saves the user’s time. While creating harnesses, we kept most the original
code that WINNIE generated. Without the aid of our system, the user would have had
to manually record all of the corresponding function calls and their arguments. The API
sequences WINNIE generates also gives useful clues to the user. In the example harness
for XnView, since WINNIE extracted 4 calls to the same API with differing arguments, one
could conclude that the API’s purpose was to initialize various attributes of an object. In
our experiments, WINNIE successfully inferred some relationships present in the program
(§4.4.4). For example, WINNIE automatically detected that an opened file handle is passed
to the next function (lines 6 and 10 in the example Figure 4.3) WINNIE also informs users
about constant values, suggesting that they may be magic values that should not be modified.
78
To assess the usability of WINNIE and its ability to aid human researchers, we recruited
two information security M.S. students who were unaware of the project. They were asked
to use WINNIE to create fuzzing harnesses for Windows applications of their choice. Within
3 days, they were able to produce 7 functional harnesses, spending roughly only 3 hours
per harness on average. The harness generator was most effective when it could rely on a
single LCA API (e.g., Table 4.7: 7z). In these cases, the user only needed to collect program
run traces and provide them to the harness generator. Upon receiving the trace, WINNIE
automatically calculated the LCA and generated C code to correctly invoke the function.
Weaknesses. Although most harnesses worked with few modifications, ACDSee and
HWP-jpeg in particular required relatively large modifications (e.g., 34.3% and 16.3%
respectively). This is mainly because they passed complex objects and virtual functions to
the library’s API. One challenge was reconstructing the custom structure layouts without the
original source code. Although WINNIE dissects structures and pointer chains from the trace
to provide plausible inferences, WINNIE is not perfect. To correct this, we analyzed the
object using a decompiler and identified eight variables and four function pointers. Second,
we manually extracted the callback functions by adding decompiled code. We followed the
function pointers from the trace, and copied the decompiled code into the harness. There
will always be some cases that WINNIE cannot handle. We discuss a few examples in §4.8,
and we hope to support them in future versions of WINNIE.
4.7.4 Overall Results
Overall Testing Results
Figure 4.9 shows the ability of each fuzzer to find new coverage. Overall, WINNIE dis-
covered 3.6× more basic blocks than WinAFL-DR and 4.1× more basic blocks than
WinAFL-IPT. We also applied statistical tests, using p-values to compare the performance
of three fuzzers, as suggested by [126]. For WinAFL-DR and WinAFL-IPT, all trials except
HWP-jpeg have p-values less than 0.05, meaning that WINNIE’s improvement is statistically
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Product Buggy File Size Bug Type(s) Bug(s)
Source Engine engine.dll 6.1M ND 2
MS WinDBG pdbcopy.exe 743K Arbitrary OOB read 1
MS Windows makecab.exe 82K Double free 1
Visual Studio ml.exe 475K SBOF 1
undname.exe 23K SOF 1
Alzip Egg.dll 131K ND 1
Tar.dll 114K Integer underflow 1
Alz.dll 123K Stack OOB read 1
Ultra ISO ultraISO.exe 5.3M Integer overflow, SOF 2
Uninitialized use 1
XnView ldf_jpm.dll 709K HC, Integer overflow 2
Hancom Office HncBmp10.flt 85K Heap BOF 2
HncJpg,Png,Gif 134-225K ND 3
HncDxf10.flt 242K ND, Integer overflow 3
HncTif10.flt 645K HR, TC, FC, HC 6
IMDRW9.flt 147K ND, SBOF 2
ISGDI32.flt 760K Heap UAF, HC 3
IBPCX9.flt 83K Integer overflow, ND 2
FFMpeg FFmpeg.dll† 12.8M Div by zero 1
Uriparser uriparse.exe† 157K Integer underflow 1
Gomplayer RtParser.exe 18K SOF, SBOF, ND 3
EzPDF ezPDFEditor.exe 23.9M Race condition, ND 3
Pdf2Office.dll 3.2M SBOF, SOF, ND 3
VLC player Mediainfo.dll 136K Integer underflow 1
libfaad.dll 273K ND, Denial of service 2
Utable Utable.exe 874K SBOF 1
RetroArch bnes.dll 2.4M ND 2
emux_gb.dll 419K ND, Div by zero 3
snes_9x.dll 2.8M Heap OOB write 1
quicknes.dll 1.0M Div by zero 1
Capture2Text C2T_CLI.exe 558K ND 1
Total 32 19 61
ND: Null-ptr dereference, HR: Heap OOB read, HC: Heap corruption, TC: Type
confusion, FC: Field confusion, SOF: Stack overflow, SBOF: Stack buffer overflow
Table 4.10: Bugs found by WINNIE. We discovered total 61 unique vulnerabilities from 32 binaries.
All vulnerabilities were discovered on the latest version of COTS binaries. We reported all bugs to
the developers. “†” indicates that the bug existed in the released binary, but the developer had already




WINNIE’s approach scales to complex, real-world software. To highlight the effectiveness of
our approach, we applied our system to non-trivial programs that are not just large in size but
also accompany complicated logic and GUI code. We also included binaries from several
well-known open-source projects because most of them have only been heavily fuzzed on
Linux operating systems; thus their Windows-specific implementations may still contain
bugs. Among them all, WINNIE found 61 previously unknown bugs in 32 binaries (shown
in Table 4.10). All these bugs are unique. These bugs cover 19 different types, including but
not limited to stack and heap buffer overflow, type confusion, double free, uninitialized use,
and null pointer dereference. At the time of writing, we have reported these bugs to their
corresponding maintainers and are working with them to help fix the bugs.
4.8 Discussion
Due to the difficulty of fuzzing closed-source, GUI-based applications, most Windows
programs are tested either by unscalable manual efforts, or are only evaluated during the
development by their vendors. In contrast, Linux programs are consistently tested and
improved at all stages of the software lifecycle by researchers over the world. Most prior
fuzzing work also has been concentrated on Linux systems. However, as shown in our
evaluation, it is easy to find many bugs in Windows software we target—especially given
the legacy code bases involved. Nevertheless, we identify several limitations of WINNIE,
which can be addressed in the future to better test more programs.
Limitations of Harness-Based Testing. Testing the program with a harness limits the
coverage within the selected features. In the case of WINNIE, we cannot reach any code
in unforeseen features absent from the trace. Thus, the maximum code coverage possible
is limited to the API set the trace covers; the number of generated harness is limited by
the number of inputs traced. To mitigate this issue, we recommend users to collect as
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many sample inputs as possible to generate a diverse set of harnesses. Although we cannot
eliminate this problem inherited from harness-based testing, automatic harness generation
will help alleviate the burden of manually creating many harnesses.
Highly-Coupled Programs. It is more challenging for WINNIE to generate harnesses for
applications tightly coupled with their libraries. As the logic is split into two binaries, the
program may use frequent cross-module calls to communicate, making it hard to accurately
identify and extract the relevant code we wish to fuzz. In Adobe Reader, for instance, the
main executable AcroRd32.exe is simply a thin wrapper of the library AcroRd32.dll [102].
There are a lot of functions calls between these two binaries, or with other libraries, like
jp2.dll. Thus, the harness generator needs to handle calls between the main executable
and a library, callbacks from a library to the main executable, and calls between libraries.
Our system focuses on handling cases where the communication merely happens within two
components. To support more complicated invocations like in Adobe Reader, we plan to
improve our tracer and generator to capture a complete trace of inter-module control- and
data-flow.
False Positives. Inaccurate harnesses may generate invalid crashes or exceptions that
do not occur in the original program. As a result, WINNIE will mistakenly assume the
presence of a bug, leading to a false positive. As described in §4.4.5, WINNIE combats
false positives by pre-verifying candidate harnesses during synthesis. Still, eliminating false
positives requires a non-negligible effort. Since bug validation must be conducted against
the actual application, constructing a suitable input file and interacting with the GUI is
required. For example, when fuzzing Adobe Reader’s image parser, end-to-end verification
requires creating a new PDF with the buggy image embedded, and then opening the image
via the GUI. This step can be automated on a per-target basis, and it is mostly an engineering
effort. Nevertheless, as long as WINNIE can generate high-quality harnesses, this validation
incurs little overhead due to the small number of false crashes.
Focus on Shared Libraries. WINNIE’s harness generator focuses testing shared libraries
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because shared libraries represent a clear API boundary. Past harness generation work also
focuses on testing functions within libraries [100, 101]. Moreover, unlike calls to exported
functions in libraries, private functions in the main executable are difficult to extract into
independent functions. To fuzz the main binary, we rely on our injected fork-server, allowing
any target address in the main binary to be fuzzed.
Performance Versus Persistent Mode. We noticed that WinAFL occasionally shows bet-
ter performance on certain target applications, typically simple ones. Upon investigation, we
found that the performance difference ultimately stems from WinAFL’s strong assumptions
about the target application. Specifically, WinAFL assumes the harness will not change any
global state and will cleanly return back to the caller (§4.3.2). Therefore, it only restores
CPU registers and arguments each loop iteration. Instead, WINNIE uses fork to comprehen-
sively preserve the entire initialized program state, which incurs a little overhead. However,
as shown in the evaluation, our conservative design makes WINNIE support significantly
more programs. Although WinAFL performs better on simple programs, it could not test
even half of the programs in our evaluation (§4.7.1).
Other input modes. In our evaluation, we focused on fuzzing libraries which accept
inputs from files or standard input. Another common way programs accept input is through
network packets. WINNIE supports this case. To fuzz these network applications, we
extended WINNIE by implementing a de-socket [127, 128] technique to redirect socket
traffic to the fuzzer.
4.9 Extension: Automatic Generation of Internet Scans for Malware
Remotely accessible applications such as remote access trojans or remote desktop programs
are a class of applications that allows an attacker interactive connection to the remote
computers. Regardless of their original purpose, these applications have been widely used to
leak private information from the remote machine to an attacker; thus rapidly scanning the
application and identifying the malicious campaign are the key to protect normal users from
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stealing their private data. We extend WINNIE’s harness generator for rapid-prototyping
malware and extracting the network scanning signature for the two-sided internet scanning
and the longitudinal study. To generate the internet scanning signature from any given
binary samples, we implemented a prototype of the BLUEPRINT system. First, BLUEPRINT
builds a harness program to restore the intended networking behavior such as opening
a port and accepting a connection. Second, it retrieves input values that can trigger the
data-sending functions (e.g., send()). Without the returned message from the sample, the
network scanner is not able to classify the program from the connected port.
The main challenge of the internet scanning signature extraction is the uncertainty of
the collected samples. Since the dataset is reported and collected without the full packaged
information, the typical sample does not provide source code or description about the
binary, which demands researchers to conduct heavyweight manual binary analysis to
understand the sample’s structure. It is also challenging because triggering the intended or
hidden networking behavior (e.g., listening a port and accepting a connection) requires an
intervention by the user. For an example of the typical remote desktop server which employs
GUI, we need to emulate the same user interaction such as clicking the icon or typing text
data to enable the server. If the sample requires special conditions like the existence of a
specific file or registry, triggering the behavior becomes more difficult. Besides, hidden
information in the binary is challenging to discover. For example, the binary can read the
socket configuration data (e.g., port number) from its data section and decrypt on-the-fly;
thus, typical static analysis is not able to extract the configuration data for extracting the
signature.
Definition: Generating Network Scanning Signature. The problem of generating the
network scanning signature is defined as: given any collected binaries, extract any payload
value to return unique string through the listening socket and its socket configurations that
reduce the scanning space. The extracted scanning signature consists of payload, expected
return message, and socket configurations.
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Research Scope. Analyzing the malicious binary is challenging because the distributor
oftentimes attempts to hide their intention by using multiple protection techniques. To limit
the scope of our research, we made the following assumptions about the handled sample to
be analyzed by BLUEPRINT:
• BLUEPRINT collects samples from any repositories. We do not demand the de-
scription or source code of the sample, or dependent library files. Also, we do
not selectively collect malware. Instead, we assume that the sample is potentially
malicious if it contains port-listening ability.
• Network APIs are used in the sample. Since we are extracting the network scanning
signature, the binary should contain the ability to listen to a port and exchange data
with an external network.
• The collected sample invokes the imported network APIs and the cross-reference to
the that exist in the binary; thus we discard the collected sample if the networking
functionality is unreachable (i.e., dead code).
• Since our approach combines both static and dynamic analysis, we consider binary
packing and obfuscation as an orthogonal problem with our approach and they require
additional or manual analysis; hence, they are not appropriate for large-scale analysis.
• The sample does not require solving a complex cryptographic challenges to retrieve
the internet scanning signature.
4.9.1 BLUEPRINT’s Methodology
To overcome the aforementioned challenges and extract the network scanning signatures,
we employ two methods:
• Network operation restoration: A method to reveal the hidden functions and force to
replay the network operation.
• Microscopic symbolic execution: A method to solve the existing constraints to dis-
cover the scanning input to send out unique string to the external network.
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Method Pattern Fuzzing Sym-exec Manual BLUEPRINT
Extract signature ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Extract auxiliary ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Validation ✗ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔
Scalability ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔
Table 4.11: Comparision between various scanning signature extraction techniques. We
compare several key features ath we believe are essential to effective extraction process. BLUEPRINT
aims to bring the ease and efficience solution.
The Network operation restoration method aims to generate a harness program to run the
collected sample without resolving the complicated conditions that the sample contains
initially. To be specific, we apply both static and dynamic binary analysis and identify the
candidate functions that can reach out to the network APIs. Once we have the candidate
function addresses, we execute the target function with proper arguments until we success-
fully activate the networking routine. To extract the scanning signatures with scale, we
utilize Microscopic symbolic execution which runs on reachable and relatively short paths.
For example, we let the symbolic execution engine works between recv() and send() if it
is reachable from the recv().
To the best of our knowledge, BLUEPRINT is the first approach to automatically extract
internet scanning signatures on a large-scale. Nevertheless, various approaches achieved
similar goals with BLUEPRINT. String extraction technique [129], fuzzing-based [130], and
symbolic execution-based[131] approaches are proposed. Unfortunately, no methods can
extract network scanning signatures on a large-scale. Table 4.11 compares BLUEPRINT
with other available techniques. String extraction can extract several candidate payloads but
does not validate the data on the program. If fuzzing discovers a special input to trigger
the actual network operation, it can extract the signature and validate it with the program.
However, fuzzing usually requires countless executions; thus cannot tell the success in a
short amount of time. Symbolic execution is a good way to reveal the scanning signature
with well-defined beginning and termination locations. Unfortunately, it cannot validate
the signature because the execution does not operate on the live socket. Although manual
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analysis can discover and validate the signature, this method is not applicable for large-scale
analysis. In this thesis, we attempt to resolve the aforementioned concerns and make the
signature extraction process effective and efficient.
4.9.2 System Architecture
We present BLUEPRINT, an end-to-end system that conducts malware binary analysis to
effectively and efficiently extract the internet scanning signatures. BLUEPRINT contains
two components, a harness generator that restore an active network operation for scrapping
signature and validation, and a signature generator that can resolve constraints to discover
particular input to send out unique string to an external network. Figure 4.10 presents
an overview of our system. BLUEPRINT accepts collected samples from the repositories
(e.g., VirusTotal [132]). Given the sample, the Harness generator quickly classifies and
decides whether to allocate further resources or discard. Suppose we select the sample for
the next step analysis. We generate a harness program that load the sample binary into
the virtual memory and calls the specific function (i.e., reachable to network APIs) by
leveraging the hybrid binary analysis. From the harness, the Signature extractor retrieves
scanning signature and auxiliary information (e.g., port number or internet address) from
the symbolic executions. Finally, BLUEPRINT returns the scanning rule and launches the
internet scanning.
When generating the scanning signature, we follow the four steps:
1 For rapid prototype, we discard any samples if we are not able to apply static binary
analysis; thus we check binary packing, customized import address table (IAT), the existence
of network API, and cross-reference to the network API.
2 For binary analysis, we reconstruct function call graphs and collect function call paths
between any connection control function (e.g., accept()) to the data exchange functions
(e.g., recv() or send()). To obtain the necessary information for the harness generation



















































































































































































































































































the real function call paths and control flow graph. For the signature extraction, BLUEPRINT
additionally infers multiple pairs of start/end addresses of the symbolic execution.
3 For harness generation, we infer the least common ancestor (LCA) function of the
essential network APIs and call the function with proper arguments.
4 For signature extraction, BLUEPRINT conducts multiple small-scale symbolic execu-
tions and generates the scanning signatures.
4.9.3 Network Primitive Restoration
The goal of network primitive restoration is to reproduce the active network operation from
the given samples without knowing the actual usage of the binary.
Rapid Prototyping. BLUEPRINT rapidly prototypes the given samples and classify the
binaries before engaging the heavy static and dynamic binary analysis because they require
a significant amount of H/W resource and time; hence, rapid prototyping is critical for the
large-scale application. To do so, BLUEPRINT conducts sequential analysis and quickly
classifies binary. First, we check segment names and match those names with well-known
binary packer’s signature. Second, we enumerate the network-related functions from the
import address table and check cross-reference to the functions (i.e., any instruction to
call the network API). Finally, BLUEPRINT removes duplicated files. In particular, we
de-duplicate the samples with the aid of imphash (i.e., a hash of library/API names).
Hybrid Binary Analysis. Now that we have collected analyzable and unique samples,
our goal in this stage is to provide sufficient internal information by using hybrid analysis,
which is a critical process for harness generation, extracting signature, and extracting the
auxiliary information. Once we receive the results from the static analysis, then we fix any
misidentified data with solid information collected from the dynamic execution trace.
Table 4.12 shows the list of items that BLUEPRINT demands for further operations.
We first enumerate boundary information of all basicblocks and functions as well as their
signatures and decompiled code ( 1 , 2 , and 5 ). Then, we reconstruct call graph of all
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Class S/D† Type What to analyze and collect
1 Basicblock S address start, end address pairs
2 Function S signature address, name, argument types
3 Call path S address call path to the network APIs
4 Basicblock path S address basicblock path for each call path address
5 Decompile S code decompiled code for each referenced function
6 Sym-exec S address start, end address pairs for symbolic execution
7 hton/inet_addr S data inferred port numbers and internet addresses
8 Loaded module D data list of loaded modules and addresses
9 Run trace D address observed call path and basicblock addresses
†: Static or Dynamic binary analysis
Table 4.12: Collected information during the hybrid binary analysis. BLUEPRINT runs static
analysis first and applies the dynamic analysis if the applied heuristics requires dynamic run trace. To
reduce the collected volume, BLUEPRINT calculate function call and basicblock paths to the network
API and collects the auxiliary information if it belongs to the paths.
Name Description
1 LCA Infer the least common ancestor functions and call them
2 force_init Initialize the socket on behalf of the sample
3 socket_arg Provide active socket as a function’s argument
4 infer_arg Provide proper arguments to minimize error
5 fake_lib Provide crafted library to avoid dependency error
6 before_crash Run before program makes crash and try other heuristics
7 force_exec Force the execution toward the network APIs
Table 4.13: Heuristics used for the harness generation.
functions to extract call paths to the network APIs ( 3 ) and calculate the basicblock paths
for each referenced function in the call paths ( 4 ). For the symbolic execution, BLUEPRINT
retrieves pair of start and end addresses, and we infer the expected port number and internet
address by checking the argument of corresponding functions ( 6 and 7 ).
Harness Generation. A wrapper program, namely harness, makes the collected sample
alive and activates the intended network operation. By doing so, BLUEPRINT can directly
extract signatures from the activated port or validate signatures among the candidates pro-
posed by the symbolic execution; thus this is one of the key components. We automatically
apply a set of rules and return a C code to generate a harness program. Table 4.13 shows the
heuristics that we empirically found very useful:
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• Call LCA function: We load the target binary and call the LCA function to trigger
the hidden behavior.
• Forced socket initialization: we first initialize the socket in the harness and then
invoke the LCA function for configuring and controlling the socket.
• Active socket as argument: If we identify a function that requires listening or
accepting the socket, we handle the socket initialization and pass the activated socket
as an argument.
• Safe argument: When we pass a constant or pointer to the function, we allocate
memory (e.g., heap) and fill with the value because the passed variable could be
referenced with an offset; thus allowing access to the nearby address will decrease the
error ratio.
• Fake library generation: BLUEPRINT examines the import address table and recon-
structs the fake library file with all function names included.
• Run sample until crash: We patch the crash-inducing instruction and let the execu-
tion stop before the crash. Then, we invoke the LCA function.
• Forced execution: If the execution does not visit the path that we expected but failed
to call the network APIs, we patch the binary to force the execution to the intended
direction.
4.9.4 Network Scanning Signature Extraction
We use symbolic execution to extract any string or character array for the scanning signature.
During the extraction, we do both intra- and inter-procedural symbolic executions. For
the intra-procedural symbolic execution, BLUEPRINT retrieves the partial LCA addresses
which can reach to the specific network APIs internally. For example, the LCA function
address contains APIs for connection control and data exchange. Knowing the function
and its corresponding APIs, BLUEPRINT discovers several candidate address pairs for the
symbolic execution. If we confirm that the intra-procedural execution is not available, then
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Category Component Lines of code
Binary analyzer Triaging 1.0K LoC of Python
Static analysis 1.2K LoC of Python
Driver generator Dynamic analysis 0.3K LoC of C++
Builder 2.3K LoC of Python
Signature extractor Symbolic executor 0.3K LoC of Python
Rule gen & Scanner 0.8K LoC of GoLang
Table 4.14: BLUEPRINT components and code size
we seek a chance to the inter-procedural execution. To do so, we choose another LCA
address that acrosses multiple callees to the network APIs, and then locates the address pairs.
After the symbolic execution, if we discover the solution to resolve the existing constraints,
retrieving the input value and expected output is a trivial process. Since all network APIs
have a clear description of their arguments, we can directly read the memory data from the
end state. For example, if our execution ends at send() function, we can access the memory
on the second argument, which is the address of the buffer, and finally extract the string.
4.9.5 Prototype Implementation and Preliminary Evaluation
We evaluated BLUEPRINT on collected samples to answer the following evaluation ques-
tions:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of BLUEPRINT: Can BLUEPRINT apply techniques to
a large variety of malicious applications? How efficient is BLUEPRINT in processing
large datasets? (§4.9.5)
• Extracted scanning signature: Can BLUEPRINT discover the ready-to-use scanning
signature? (§4.9.6)
Implementation. We prototyped BLUEPRINT with 5.9K lines of code as shown in Ta-
ble 4.14. BLUEPRINT handles both 32- and 64-bit PE binaries running on Windows OS.
Statis analysis relies on IDA [116] and dynamic analysis conducts binary instrumentation























Figure 4.11: Filtered samples for each phase. Upon the sample acquisition, BLUEPRINT passes
the de-deplicated files for the triaging. After removing packed and challenging files due to the unclear
API paths, BLUEPRINT starts the hybrid analysis.
Driver generator Signature extractor
Overall Applied heuristics (%) Payload Response Port
EXE DLL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 #
10/80 6/20 80% 45% 10% 60% 10% 25% 35% 3.1 3/100 3/100 7/100
Table 4.15: Effectiveness of the replayer and signature extractor. We ran BLUEPRINT on 100
unique samples. Overall, BLUEPRINT was able to enable the port-listening on 20 samples. “Applied
heuristics” indicates the ratio of used heuristics and the last column shows the average number of
heuristics for individual sample. “Signature extractor” shows the number of succeeded symbolic
execution including constraint solving and concretization.
bolic execution and implements the rule generator and internet scanner with Golang to be
compatible with ZMAP [134].
Evaluation Setup. Our evaluation mainly checks how many samples can BLUEPRINT
handle and how many internet scanning signatures are extracted. First, we configure the
YARA rule to collect any submitted samples if they have any network APIs to open a
port. Then, BLUEPRINT runs the harness generator and signature extractor to generate the
network scanning signatures. We conducted the evaluation on an Intel Xeon(R) E5-2670 v3
(24 cores at 2.30GHz) machine with 256 GB RAM. For the initial triaging, hybrid analysis,
and harness generation, we run the evaluation on Windows 10 virtual machine. For the
symbolic execution and the internet scanning, we run on Ubuntu 18.04.
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Effectiveness and Efficiency of BLUEPRINT
First, we evaluate how well BLUEPRINT extracts internet scanning signatures effectively
and efficiently. To do so, we traced how individual sample is classified, passed, or discarded
for each stage.
Rapid-Prototyping. The purpose of the rapid-prototyping is to discard any samples that
BLUEPRINT is not able to handle and preserve the available resource for other passed
binaries. Figure 4.11 shows the performance of our rapid-prototyping process and the
ratio of the filtered binaries for each stage. We initially collected 10,000 samples and
de-duplicated 95.4% of files, which remained to 460 files. Among the 460 samples, we
launched the BLUEPRINT’s triaging component. During the classification, BLUEPRINT
applied several pattern matching to identify packed binaries and analyzed call instructions
to the imported network APIs to find “challenging-to-analyze” binaries. During the triaging
process, BLUEPRINT passed 73% of files from the de-duplicated samples (total of 336
binaries) to the next stage (i.e., hybrid analysis) after removing 13% of packed binaries and
14% of unapplicable binaries.
Hybrid Analysis. Before the actual harness generation, hybrid analysis plays a key role
for both harness generation and symbolic execution by providing all necessary data to each
component from the one-time analysis. After accepting the triaged binaries, the following
hybrid analysis discovers the function call and basicblock execution paths to the network
APIs as much as possible. Figure 4.11 shows the success ratio and Table 4.15 displays the
detailed result of the harness generator and signature extractor. Among all samples from the
triaging, hybrid analysis succeeded to finish the mission on 83% of binaries.
Harness generation and signature extraction. BLUEPRINT’s harness generator success-
fully opened a port for 14% of EXE files and 25% of DLL files. As shown in Table 4.15,
all seven heuristics were used during the harness generation process and an average of
3.1 heuristics was used for all samples. Among all heuristics, function-LCA (heuristic- 1)
94
and argument inference (heuristic- 4) were most frequently used, recording 80% and 60%
respectively. Also, symbolic execution succeeded in extracted the signature about the string
and port number. On average, symbolic execution extracted meaningful information from
5% of the binaries.
The efficiency of the harness and signature generation. Since BLUEPRINT aims to
support large-scale signature generation, it should pass all pipelines quickly without using
many resources. Table 4.16 shows the amount of data collected and elapsed time for
processing the samples. Compare to all existing functions and basicblocks, BLUEPRINT
partially collects necessary information only. For example, when the binary size is less
than 1MB, BLUEPRINT collected an average of 3.0 paths for the string extractor and 25.6
function information (e.g., decompiled code and signature) that belong to the path. It means
that BLUEPRINT collects 1.1% of function information from the entire binary.
BLUEPRINT spent 363.7 seconds processing one sample on average. In particular,
hybrid analysis required 175.2 seconds, and symbolic execution required 92.9 seconds,
which accounts for 48.1% and 25.5% of the total execution time respectively. Note that
the average time does not correspond to all samples collected. For example, as shown in
Figure 4.11, many samples are de-duplicated or discarded during the triaging stage. In
this case, the discarded samples consume time for calculating imphash or triaging (see the
“triaging” column in Table 4.16).
4.9.6 Extracted Signatures and Validation
BLUEPRINT’s approach scales to large-scale analysis. To highlight the applicability, we
applied BLUEPRINT to randomly collected samples and attempted to extract the scanning
signature. Table 4.17 shows the 23 signatures for the internet scanning. Among the
signatures, generated harness discovers 18 signatures and symbolic execution discovers 5























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis proposes two systems to strengthen and weaken the binary analysis process. For
weakening the two notable binary analysis techniques, fuzzing and symbolic execution, this
thesis proposes a new attack mitigation system, called FUZZIFICATION, for developers to
prevent adversarial fuzzing. We develop three principled ways to hinder fuzzing: injecting
delays to slow fuzzed executions; inserting fabricated branches to confuse coverage feedback;
transforming data-flows to prevent taint analysis and utilizing complicated constraints to
cripple symbolic execution. We design robust anti-fuzzing primitives to hinder attackers
from bypassing FUZZIFICATION.
On the other hand, for enabling the fuzzing on the Windows application, this thesis
presents WINNIE, an end-to-end system to support fuzzing Windows applications. Instead
of repeatedly running the program directly, WINNIE synthesizes lightweight harnesses to
directly invoke interesting functions, bypassing GUI code. It also features an implementation
of fork on Windows to clone processes efficiently.
5.2 Future work
This dissertation presents three prototype systems: FUZZIFICATION, WINNIE, and BLUEPRINT.
In this section, we discuss research topics to be handled in the near future.
5.2.1 Delay primitive on different H/W environments
We adopt CSmith-generated code as our delay primitives using measured delay on one
machine (i.e., developer’s machine). This configuration implies that those injected delays
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might not be able to bring the expected slow down to the fuzzed execution with more
powerful hardware support. On the other hand, the delay primitives can cause higher
overhead than expected for regular users with less powerful devices. To handle this, we
plan to develop an additional variation that can dynamically adjust the delay primitives at
runtime. Specifically, we measure the CPU performance by monitoring a few instructions
and automatically adjusting a loop counter in the delay primitives to realize the accurate
delay in different hardware environments. However, the code may expose static pattern such
as time measurement system call or a special instruction like rdtsc; thus we note that this
variation has inevitable trade-off between adaptability and robustness.
5.2.2 Handling complicated data structure in harness
Custom structures. Beyond this initial work towards practical Windows fuzzing, we
identify several directions for future improvement. Among the following, we believe that
handling structures and callback functions is fundamentally challenging, whereas supporting
other ABIs or languages would be relatively straightforward.
Structures. Custom structures are challenging to both automatic testing tools and human
researchers, and incorrect structures may lead to program crashes. To mitigate this issue, we
could apply a memory pre-planning technique [135] to provide probabilistic guarantees to
avoid crashes. We could also use memory breakpoints to trace the detailed memory access
patterns of the program and infer the structure layouts.
Callback functions. Callback functions in the main executable make harness generation
difficult. In our example Figure 4.3, we reconstructed the callback function by copying
decompiled code from the main binary into the harness. For simple callbacks, we could
automatically add decompiled code to the harness. For complicated cases, we could load
the main binary and call the functions directly, as copied code is not always reliable.
Support for Non-C ABIs. WINNIE focuses on C-style APIs, and we did not investigate
fuzzing programs with other ABIs. In our experience during the evaluation, these libraries
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are rare in practice. In the future, WINNIE can be extended to support other native languages’
ABIs, like C++, Rust, or Go.
Bytecode languages and interpreted binaries. While WINNIE supports most native
applications, it does not support applications compiled for a virtual machine (e.g., .NET,
Java). To support these binaries, specialized instrumentation techniques [136] should be
used to collect code coverage.
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